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ABSTRACT
Extra-Legal Information Transfer During Eyewitness Identification
by
Andrew Joseph Evelo
Advisor: Margaret Bull Kovera
Researchers recommend that eyewitness lineups be conducted by administrators who do not
know which lineup member is the suspect (i.e., that lineups be administered in a double-blind
manner). Research on the effects of administrator knowledge generally support the idea that
single-blind lineups damage the integrity of the lineup procedure and can lead to increases in the
false identification of innocent suspects (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). This body of research has
either explicitly stated or implicitly assumed that these negative effects are the result of
leakage—that is, administrators are conveying information to witnesses about which lineup
member to pick. Borrowing from dual-process models in social psychology, we used two studies
to test an administrator-eyewitness interaction model in which information is passed from the
single-blind administrator to the eyewitness if and only if there is motivation and ability to do so.
Study 1 (the Cue Transmission Study) failed to replicate administrator influence effects and was
unable to test their moderation. The results of Study 2 (the Cue Reception Study), however,
indicated that a witness’s ability and motivation were crucial to the interpretation of cueing
information from an administrator. The later results support the use of social dual-process
models in understanding lineup interactions, signify the importance of understanding witness
variables—not just administrator behavior—in lineups, and continue to support the
recommendation that lineups be conducted in a double-blind manner (Wells et al., 2020).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
A large body of research and growing list of DNA exonerations show that eyewitness
identification can be problematic. Psychological researchers have made a number of
recommendations to improve identification accuracy (Wells et al., 1998, 2020). These reforms
deal with system variables—so called because these factors can be controlled by the justice
system to improve the reliability of lineup identifications. There are a number of
recommendations. For example, investigators should ensure suspects do not stand out from other
lineup members, lineups contain only one suspect, lineups are video recorded, and witnesses’
confidence in their identifications is obtained immediately after the identification. Of these
recommendations, one crucial recommendation for maintaining fair lineups is that lineups be
conducted by an administrator who does not know the identity of the suspect (i.e., lineup should
be double-blind; Kovera & Evelo, 2017).
The double-blind administration recommendation stems primarily from research on
interpersonal expectancy effects. Expectancy effects are self-fulfilling prophesies; they occur
when some outcome is not the result of the actual phenomenon of interest but instead is the result
of the expectations themselves (Michael et al., 2012). Interpersonal expectancy effects occur
during a social interaction in which one person’s expectations affect the behavior of another
(Rosenthal, 2002). The concern for lineups is that administrators’ knowledge of the suspect’s
identity will cause the administrator to emit subtle cues regarding the suspect’s identity; these
cues will influence witnesses’ identification accuracy by increasing identifications of the suspect
irrespective of guilt.
The limited empirical research on single-blind lineups generally supports the claim that
administrators in single-blind lineups (i.e., administrators who know which lineup member is the
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suspect) unfairly influence lineups in multiple ways (Kovera & Evelo, 2017), including getting
the witness to pick the suspect (e.g., Greathouse & Kovera, 2009 ), increasing successful
witnesses confidence (e.g., Wells & Bradfield, 1998), and selectively recording results consistent
with their hypothesis (e.g., Rodriguez & Berry, 2019). These biases result from administrator
cueing of witnesses, and this cueing has applied and theoretical consequences. From an applied
standpoint, the courts assume that eyewitness memory is the result of the witnessed event, not
the behavior of the administrator. From a theoretical standpoint, the transmission and receipt of
nonverbal cues supports a model of expectancy effects (Jussim, 1986; Rosenthal, 2002; Trusz &
Bąbel, 2016) that has rarely been studied in its entirety. The purpose of the current project is to
study the transmission and receipt of potentially biasing information through the application of
Rosenthal’s Expectancy Effect Model (1994, 2002) and extending this model into an
administrator-eyewitness interaction model.
Expectancy Effects
Expectancy effects are self-fulfilling prophecies in which a person’s expectations for a
given outcome cause that outcome to occur (Michael et al., 2012; Trusz & Bąbel, 2016). One of
the earliest definitions comes from Merton (p. 195, 1948, emphasis in original) who said a “selffulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior
which makes the originally false conception come true.” The placebo effect—probably the most
well know expectancy effect—occurs when psychological or physiological changes occur due to
inert medications that are believed to have the effect (Kirsch, 1985; Price et al., 2008). More
generally, a person’s expectations can affect their behaviors (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1997),
perceptions (e.g., Jussim, 1989), social interactions (e.g., Kleck & Strenta, 1980), and close
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relationships (e.g., Downey et al., 1998). These effects occur in myriad situations, including legal
settings (Hart, 1995; Kassin et al., 2003).
The research most applicable to the lineup procedure is on interpersonal expectancy
effects. Intrapersonal expectancy effects (like the placebo effect) deal with a how a person’s
expectations affect their own behaviors or outcomes; interpersonal expectancy effects deal with
how a person’s expectations affect someone else’s behaviors or outcomes (for reviews, see
Rosenthal, 2002; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978; Trusz & Bąbel, 2016). Here, we will refer to the
former as the expecter and the latter as the target.
Two classic experiments best illustrate how an expecter’s expectations can affect a
target’s outcome. In one study, the expecters were undergraduates teaching mice (the targets) a
maze task using operant conditioning (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963a). By random assignment, the
researchers told some of the students that their mice were “smart” and others that their mice were
“dull.” In line with the students’ expectations, “dull” mice took longer to learn the task than did
“smart” mice. In a similar experiment, experimenters manipulated teachers’ expectations by
telling them that their students had taken a test suggesting that certain students were “spurters”
who would show substantial gains in performance over the next year; in fact, the labels were
randomly assigned to the students (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). After a year, the “spurters”
showed IQ gains consistent with the teachers’ expectations (especially those in lower grades).
Rosenthal (2002; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978) hypothesized that teachers treated the “spurters”
differently—possibly creating a warmer environment, spending more time with them, giving
them more opportunities to succeed, and giving them better feedback—because the teachers
expected them to do well. It was the teachers’ expectations and differential behavior—not any
innate potential—that caused the different outcomes.
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This expectancy effect research and other social research being conducted at the time
raised concerns about experimenter bias in behavioral research (Weber & Cook, 1972). The fear
was that the behavior of research participants was not the result of the independent variables but
the result of the researchers’ expectations—that is their hypotheses. Rosenthal and Fode (1963b)
tested this experimentally in a series of three studies in which they assigned participants to be
either the “experimenter” or the “subject.” Subjects rated neutral faces on how much apparent
success they were expressing on a scale from -10 (extreme failure) to +10 (extreme success). The
researchers manipulated the participant experimenters’ expectations by telling half that the
results should indicate failure (-5) while telling the others that the results should indicate success
(+5). The researchers also informed the participant experimenters that the results were well
established and that they would be paid more for doing a good job. Mean ratings of the faces
were significantly different and in the direction of the experimenter’s positive (+4.05) or
negative (-0.95) expectations. Participant experimenters were able to convey their hypotheses to
the participant targets, who acted on that information.
Because of Rosenthal’s studies and others, psychologists and other social scientists began
to worry about hypothesis leakage—the process by which participants learn what was being
studied during an experiment. Orne (1962) noted that humans are not passive subjects and they
have a stake in the experimental outcome; participants are spending their time and they want to
know it was worthwhile or contributed to science. Because they have a stake in the outcome,
experimental participants try to discern the research hypothesis through cues Orne called demand
characteristics. He argued that even if the cues are meager, all participants must do this at some
level because they assume all experiments have a hidden purpose. Participants are many times
able to figure out what this hidden purpose is through differences in experimenters’ behaviors in
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different experimental conditions—sometimes called hypothesis leakage—and these differences
affect their behavior (Weber & Cook, 1972). Participants tend to act in a way consistent with the
inferred hypothesis (i.e., the expectation of the experimenter), not out of a desire to confirm the
hypothesis per se, but out of a desire to be evaluated positively by the experimenters (Weber &
Cook, 1972). In other words, they are motivated to both seem competent and help scientific
progress. Although experimenters may not be able to control this motivation on part of
participants, double-blind procedures can help limit both experimenter bias and demand
characteristics (Rosenthal, 1976; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008; Shadish et al., 2002).
The relation between researcher expectancy effects and interpersonal expectancy effects
is theoretically important because lineup procedures are closely linked with experimental
procedures. Scholars have likened lineups to an experiment that is designed to test the theory that
the suspect of a crime is the perpetrator (Wells & Luus, 1990). This analogy relies on the fact
that many aspects of the lineup have experiment-like equivalents: administrators are like
experimenters, witnesses are like participants, and the lineup is like the stimulus material. An
administrator theorizes that the suspect is the culprit, and therefore hypothesizes that the witness
will identify the suspect as the perpetrator. Like a true experiment, the results from the lineup
may or may not be consistent with the administrator’s hypothesis (i.e., the witness may or may
not identify the suspect). Even if the witness does not confirm the administrator’s hypothesis,
there is some chance that the disconfirmation is due to factors such as random chance or
predictable confounds (i.e., a Type I error). Therefore, administrators—in much the same way as
scientists increase the validity of their inferences—can increase their certainty that a suspect
identified by the witness is the perpetrator by using experimental controls (Wells & Luus, 1990).
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One such control is double-blind procedures. Specifically, double-blind procedures can serve as
a safeguard against experimenter expectancy effects and demand characteristics.
Given the lineup-as-experimental analogy and the body of research on social influence,
interpersonal expectancy effects can serve as a strong theoretical foundation to understand one of
the ways in which lineup administrators’ expectations can affect eyewitness identification. It is
likely that the process by which interpersonal expectancy effects operate (i.e., mediators) are
likely similar to the way in which administrator knowledge effects operate. Therefore, it is
important to understand the working model of interpersonal expectancy effects to understand and
limit administrator effects on eyewitness behavior during identification procedures.
The Interpersonal Expectancy Effect Mediation Model
How, then, do interpersonal expectancy effects operate? Multiple models of interpersonal
expectancy effects evolved concurrently in psychology, but all focused on the same three stages
(Jussim, 1986; Rosenthal, 2002; Trusz & Bąbel, 2016). These stages are presented in Figure 1.
As the model indicates, the expecter’s expectations (the independent variable) change the
expecter’s behavior (the mediator), which leads to differences in the target’s behavior/outcome
(the dependent variable). Figure 1 is a simplified version of the key relationship, which may have
distal moderators (Rosenthal, 2002) and intermediate mediators (Jussim, 1968). Each stage
presents an important question: 1) how are expectations formed, 2) what behaviors mediate the
effect, and 3) what real or perceived behaviors change in the target?
Forming Expectations
False or unjustified expectations are the basis of self-fulfilling prophesies. These
expectancies are formed through experience. Social information is not processed in a vacuum;
rather it is based on schemas—a framework of past experiences applied to a current situation.
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Schemas are defined as cognitive categorizations of old information that aid a perceiver in the
processing of new information (Fiske & Linville, 1980; Kelley, 1973). Because schemas help
organize past experiences, they also aid in making predictions about future experiences and
therefore produce (and are closely linked to) expectations about those future experiences. Past
experience with an individual helps the perceiver anticipate the behavior of the same or similar
individuals in the future.
The schema that is activated in a perceiver—and therefore used to form expectations
about other individuals—depends on the situation (Bem, 1972; Kelly, 1973). The activated
schema in a given situation can then have a profound influence on expectations. Schemas can
focus attention on certain stimuli, create expectations on what is being viewed, and therefore
create blindness for unexpected stimuli or events (Simmons & Chabris, 1999; Simmons &
Ambinder, 2005). The unexpectedness produced by schematic networks can also be seen in
memory research. Schema inconsistent items are often remembered more vividly by the
perceiver, likely because their unexpectedness lead to deeper processing, which increases
memory for those items (Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Pezdek et al., 1989). Schematic processing can
also produce false memories in a perceiver for expected events that never actually occurred
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Finally, schematic expectations can change behavior (e.g.,
Bargh et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997).
Mediating Behaviors
Another important question for expectancy effects is what specific behavior creates the
self-fulfilling prophesy. An expecter’s expectations cause them to exhibit a certain behavior.
Unsurprisingly, different expectancy effects are driven by different mediators—that is different
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expecter behaviors will produce different target behaviors. A few classic effects illustrate this
variety of expectancy effects.
First, social scientists have studied self-fulfilling prophesies in communication behaviors.
In one experiment, mixed gender interaction partners were told to communicate over the phone
where they could not see each other (Snyder et al., 1977). Before the conversations, male
participants received accurate biographical information and a purported picture of their partner;
in actuality, the picture was a randomly assigned photo of an unattractive or attractive female not
involved with the study. After receiving the information but before the conversation, the male
participants rated their participants on a number of social traits. Attractive stereotypes affected
the perceivers’ expectations about their conversation partner; males rated the females as less
social when they were unattractive. More importantly, these expectations affected the men’s
verbal behavior during the phone conversation. Third party judges rated men who anticipated an
attractive woman as having more friendly traits: sociable, outgoing, humorous, bold, and others.
Woman picked up on these differences in behaviors and acted similarly toward the men; both
third party judges and the men themselves rated the women as less friendly when the man had
received an unattractive photo. In this case, communication behaviors (e.g., warmness, interest,
and humor) mediated the effect of attractiveness stereotypes in producing expectancy consistent
interactions.
A meta-analysis of the Pygmalion effect—the tendency for students to improve when
their teachers expect them too—also showed the variety of behaviors that can serve as mediators
of interpersonal expectancy effects (Harris & Rosenthal, 1985). The authors examined 31
possible teacher behaviors in 135 studies that might mediate the effect. The behaviors varied
greatly in both size and scope. On the one hand, some of the behaviors were specific, small, and
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instanced: teacher speech rate, nods towards the student, and smiles towards the student. On the
other hand, some of the behaviors were general, large, and longitudinal: overall teacher warmth,
amount of material presented to a student, and persistence with a student. They grouped these 31
different behaviors into four different factors: climate (creating a warmer climate for high
expectancy students), feedback (giving more feedback to high expectancy students), input
(teaching more material to high expectancy students), and output (allow high expectancy
students more chance to excel). For instance, the climate category might contain teacher
behaviors like general positive warmth or eye contact whereas the feedback category may
contain behaviors like praise or criticism. Teachers’ expectancies affected their behavior and in
turn the teachers’ behavior affected their students’ outcomes. More to the point, the four factors
did so with varying levels of strength. For instance, feedback tended to have a small effect (ra-b =
.13, rb-c = .07) whereas input tended to have a large effect (ra-b = .26, rb-c = .33). In other words,
there were many diverse behaviors that mediate the Pygmalion effect and these behaviors vary in
relative importance.
A final example is the classic case study of Clever Hans (Pfungst et al., 1911), the horse
who could “solve” math problems by tapping his hoof. In this case, it was simple non-verbal
posture changes that mediated the key effect. Experimental studies revealed that Hans’s behavior
was solely the result of questioners’ expectations. When Hans reached the answer, the audience
members, observers, or questioner would stop looking at Hans hoofs and stand or sit more
upright. The posture change would communicate to the horse that it was time to stop tapping
(and earn a delicious carrot). However, Hans was unable to answer correctly when he was unable
to see the questioner or when the questioner did not know the correct answer to the question.
This case study is particularly crucial for understanding the effects of administrator influence on
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eyewitnesses’ identification decisions because it indicates that even small, unconscious, or
unintentional behaviors can serve as a mediator for expectancy effects.
Targets’ Behaviors
The dependent variable of interest in expectancy effects are changes in the targets’
behaviors. Most models of experimenter expectancy effects focus on observable behavior
changes in the target. Researchers have studied many behaviors that may change as a result of
targets’ expectation, including animal behavior, student performance, social interactions, and
more. Although target behavior is usually the principle focus of these studies, there may be other
related outcomes that are not target behavior per se. These cases involve behavior or perceptual
changes of the expecter which result in apparent behavior change in the target. Because
expectancies are like hypotheses, research on hypothesis confirming behaviors is relevant;
people tend to seek information that confirms rather than falsifies their hypotheses (Edwards &
Smith; 1996; Nickerson, 1998, Wason, 1960). There may be additional cognitive or motivational
effects on how this information is actually viewed (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Jussim, 1986,
1989). Applied to interpersonal behavior, expecters may only seek or view evidence in a light
that confirms their expectation (Neuberg, 2016).
Relevance to Lineups
These three stages of expectancy effects are applicable to lineups. Lineup administrators
serve as the expecter while witnesses serve as the target. Administrators who construct the lineup
know which lineup member is the suspect and—whether by past experience, the witness’s
description, or from other probative evidence—expect that the witnesses will pick their suspect.
Although this is not the only expectation that an administrator may have, it is the one that this
project is focusing on because it is most consistent with the expectancy effect literature. For
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instance, administrators may have expectations about the guilt of their suspect. However, these
expectations are not about the target’s behavior and are therefore inconsistent with expectancy
effect theory. Another possibility is that administrators may have expectations about the target’s
behavior other than their specific choice. For instance, administrators may change their behavior
(and affect the lineups outcome) if they expect the witness to struggle because other witnesses
have struggled (see Douglass et al., 2005) or they know that the witness is fragile after being
victimized (see Kovera & Evelo, 2017). Although these expectations are interesting and likely
have downstream consequences, we focus here on expectations concerning which lineup member
the witness will pick.
Assuming that administrators do expect that the witness will pick the suspect, it is likely
that this expectation will change the administrator’s behavior in some way which makes the
witness more likely to choose the suspect. Because of this behavior change, the witness will
select the suspect and confirm the expectations of the administrator. Here too there is an option
of focus; we will be focusing on actual—not apparent—behavior change.
A review of the literature on administrator influence indicates that some predictions
based on this model are well supported by empirical evidence. However, it is also clear that some
parts of the process have received only a little attention whereas other parts have received none
at all.
Research on Eyewitness and Administrator Interactions
When the American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS) recommended double-blind
administration of lineups, there was little research on administrator-eyewitness interactions; the
recommendation came from what was known about expectancy effects, the lineup-as-experiment
analogy, and potential feedback effects (Wells et al., 1998). Since then, researchers who study
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lineups have concentrated their efforts on understanding the effects of single-blind
administration during different stages of the administrator-eyewitness interaction: postidentification (resulting in confidence malleability) and pre-identification (resulting in decreased
identification accuracy; for review see Kovera & Evelo 2017).
Post-identification administrator effects refer to the effect that administrators can have on
the relationship between a witness’s confidence that their identification was accurate and their
actual accuracy. Ideally, eyewitnesses’ confidence could serve as a predictor of their accuracy
(i.e., their confidence and accuracy are calibrated). However, the confidence-accuracy
correlation varies to a large extent among studies (e.g., Sporer et al., 1995; Wixted et al., 2015)
pointing to the presence of moderators. One such moderator is confirming feedback that
witnesses might get after an identification that artificially inflates their confidence regardless of
accuracy. Confirming feedback from single-blind administrators not only attenuates the
confidence-accuracy relationship but also affects the witnesses’ meta-cognitions about their
memory (e.g., time to view the suspect) and the witnesses’ believability at trial (Bradfield et al.,
2002; Garrioch & Brimacombe, 2001; Steblay et al., 2014). Calibration tends to increase when
confidence is collected under pristine conditions, including use of double-blind procedures
(Wixted & Wells, 2017)
Pre-identification administrator influence refers to the effects that an administrator can
have on the witness’s choice from a lineup. Researchers have studied the pre-identification
administrator influence using three paradigms: the double-blind paradigm, the steering paradigm,
and the cue-disruption paradigm (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). Each paradigm is a variation on the
standard eyewitness paradigm where mock witnesses watch a mock crime and participate in a
lineup. In the double-blind paradigm, volunteers participate as either a lineup administrator or a
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witness. Researchers manipulate whether the administrator-participants know which lineup photo
is the suspect (i.e., single-blind) or not (i.e., double-blind) and then observe differences in the
administrators’ and witnesses’ behavior. In the steering paradigm, confederate researchers serve
as administrators and follow a script designed to manipulate their behaviors in ways that may
affect the witnesses’ behaviors. Finally, the cue-disruption paradigm manipulates potential
barriers that may prevent single-blind administrators from cueing witnesses with regards to
which lineup member is the suspect.
The three administrator-influence paradigms and the variables studied in these paradigms
map onto models of expectancy effect research. The entire expectancy effect model is presented
in Figure 1, which displays a simple mediation where the expecter’s expectations affect the
expecter’s behavior, which affects the target’s behavior or outcome. This model can be applied
to lineups: the administrator’s knowledge of which lineup member is the suspect affects the
administrator’s behavior, which affects the witness’s choice. Evidence from the three
paradigms—which study different aspects of the process—suggests that the expectancy effect
model is applicable to lineups. The double-blind paradigm examines how administrators transmit
cues to the; the steering and cue-disruption paradigms focus more on how a witness receives this
information. The next sections review the literature to provide evidence for the expectancy effect
model, mainly, that the administrators transmit information and that this information is used by
witness. This review shows that although some aspects of the model have strong support other
aspects of the model need further research.
Effects of Administrator Transmission of Information
A number of studies use the full-double blind paradigm (e.g., Charman & Quiroz, 2016,
Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Phillips et al., 1999; Zimmerman et al., 2017). Overall, these
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studies show that an administrator’s knowledge of which lineup member is the suspect causes
increased identifications of that suspect. This increase in identifications of the suspect occurs
even when the actual perpetrator is missing, increasing the false identification of innocent
suspects. However, the size of the effect also shows systematic variance across studies,
indicating the presence of experiment specific moderators (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). The lineup
presentation, lineup instructions, and witnesses’ memory all affect the ability of administrators to
influence the witnesses’ choice. The wide range of potential moderators is troublesome and yet
no clear theory for potential moderators has emerged.
The other crucial dependent variable in the double-blind paradigm is the administrators’
behavior. In this paradigm, researchers can analyze surreptitiously recorded videos of the lineup
and record administrator behaviors that may influence the witness. The results indicate that
single-blind administrators do commit potentially biasing behaviors—such as telling participants
to examine the lineup carefully, asking the witness to take another look after rejecting the lineup,
telling the witness that they knew which lineup member is the suspect, smiling at the witness
after they identify the suspect, and removing pictures that the witness rejected—more than
double-blind administrators (Charman & Quiroz, 2016; Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). Coders
(who are blind to condition) can also rate the level of administrator pressure to make a choice or
administrator pressure choose someone in particular. Compared to double-blind administrators,
single-blind administrators exert more overall pressure to choose and specific pressure to choose
the suspect (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Zimmerman et al., 2017).
Effects of Witness Reception of Information
It is also clear that witnesses receive and use the information sent by administrators. The first
line of evidence comes from steering studies (i.e., Clark et al., 2013; Clark et al., 2009; Rhead et
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al., 2015). The manipulated behaviors have differed in each one. In one study, the behavior was
manipulated with the intent to induce choosing through ostensible helpful behavior such as
telling the witness to “take your time” or asking the witness if there “is anyone in the lineup who
looks more similar to the person you saw than anyone else in the lineup” (Clark et al., 2009). In
the other studies, administrator behavior was manipulated using a script to change identifications
of fillers and lineup rejections into identifications of the suspect (Clark et al., 2013; Rhead et al.,
2015). Both types of manipulations increased identifications of the suspect in both culpritpresent and culprit-absent conditions. The second line of evidence comes from cue-disruption
studies, of which there has only been one. In this study, researchers did not manipulate
administrator influence but rather tried to constrain it by manipulating the contact that an
administrator had with the witness (Haw & Fisher, 2004). Administrators were trained to
conduct a lineup either sitting with the witness (high contact) or by handing the witness the
lineup materials and sitting out of view during the actual procedure (low contact). In each case,
the administrator was told who the suspect was and that they should try to get an identification of
the suspect. In line with hypothesis-leakage and extra-legal information transfer, there were more
false identifications of an innocent suspect when the administrator had the opportunity to
influence the witness during sequential lineups (30% in the high contact versus 3% in low
contact). Although there have only been a few steering and cue-disruption studies, the results
from these studies clearly show that when administrator behavior sends informational cues to the
witness and these cues affect witness behavior.
But what information is transferred? A possibility mentioned by some researchers (e.g.,
Mickes & Gronlund, 2017) is that administrators—through their behavior—give witnesses
information relevant to setting a decision criterion, which is information pertaining to how liberal

15

or conservative witnesses should be in choosing from the lineup. Perhaps the administrators’
behavior indicates that a suspect is present and that the administrator is highly confident that this
suspect is the perpetrator. Findings regarding increased choosing from the steering paradigm
support this conclusion (e.g., Clark et al., 2015).
However, other studies show that administrator knowledge of which lineup member is
the suspect influences more than just witness choosing behavior; rather, non-blind administrators
provide behavioral information about whom to pick—about which photo depicts the suspect.
There are multiple findings that can only be explained by information cueing. First, a witness’s
confidence in an identification made from a single-blind lineup depends on whether the witness
identified the suspect; specifically, witnesses in single-blind lineups who identify the suspect are
more confident than witnesses in single-blind lineups who identify a filler (Charman & Quiroz,
2016). This finding makes sense if single-blind administrators are passing along information
about the suspect’s identity which is then used by the witness to adjust their confidence;
consistent information causes confidence to go up where inconsistent information causes
confidence to go down. Additionally, single-blind administrators obtain more identifications of
the suspect at the cost of identifications of fillers but not lineup rejections, suggesting that
witnesses are receiving and using information about whom to pick (Charman & Quiroz, 2016;
Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Kovera & Evelo, 2017). Most convincingly, witnesses who first
identify fillers are more likely to switch their initial choice in single-blind lineups and are more
likely to correctly identify the suspect when they do (Kovera & Evelo, 2017).
In fact, Evelo and Kovera (2015) modeled the mechanism by which a witness could use
informational cues from an administrator. The process involved creating a version of WITNESS
(Clark, 2003), a computer model able to simulate the process of witness decision-making
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observed in real data (e.g., Goodsell et al., 2010). The model accounted for differences in
identification decisions made by witnesses in double-blind and single-blind lineups in actual data
by adding a social parameter which made information about which lineup member was the
suspect available to the witness and able to affect the simulated decisions. Information transfer
accounted for these differences without having to modify other memory or decision variables
such as the strength of the memory in the witness. This modeling exercise also indicated that
even if information about which lineup member was the suspect was available to the witness, it
was not always used; even when this information would have been helpful to the simulated
witnesses (the suspect was not the best match to their memory), they only made use of this
information about half the time. In other words, witnesses may not be affected by informational
cues even if they are sent by an administrator. This situational use of information indicates that
there are likely moderators explaining under what conditions the witness receives and uses
informational cues from the administrators.
However, few studies have looked at moderators to explain either when administrators
send information and witness receive it. The goal of the current project is to investigate these
potential moderators for both the administrator (Cue Transmission Study) and the witness (Cue
Reception Study). We also test a new framework for moderators, which organizes potential
moderators using findings from the social psychological literature.
A Framework for Moderators
The goal of this project is to extend and apply Rosenthal’s mediation model of
interpersonal expectancy effects to study the effects of a single-blind administrator’s behavior on
witnesses’ identification decisions. This new administrator-eyewitness interaction model
(pictured in Figure 2) posits a framework for moderators and indicates where these moderators
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likely affect the decision-making process. Although Rosenthal’s expectancy effect model (1994,
2002) proposed distal moderators for both the expecter and target, the model did not clearly
identify where the moderators would change the relationships between other variables in the
model (see moderator/mediator distinction in Baron & Kenny, 1986). The model also did not
specify any way to approach or categorize these potential moderators, calling them simply
“stable attributes of the expecter and the expectee” (Rosenthal, 2002, p. 844).
Here, we propose that these moderators include characteristics that may affect the
administrator’s behavior (the transmission of information cues) and the witness’ decision (the
reception of information cues). We also propose a way to organize these moderators into two
useful categories borrowed from the psychological literature on attitudes and persuasion. The
first category are “ability” variables, which effect the capacity to transmit or receive cues; the
second category are “motivation” variables, which affect the drive to transmit or receive cues.
The ability versus motivation distinction comes from the psychological literature on
attitudes and persuasion and focuses on how people assess informational cues. Dual-process
models of persuasion posit that if individuals have both the ability and motivation to use the
central (or systematic) route to process information, they will (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty &
Wegener, 1999). If they lack either the motivation or ability to fully process the information,
they will not process information at all or only process it superficially using peripheral (or
heuristic) route. In one study, for instance, participants rated a product (a message machine)
while researchers manipulated the importance of the task (motivation to process), the ambiguity
of the information (ability to process), and the amount of each information type (strong/central
versus weak/peripheral information; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). When participants were not
motivated to process or did not have the ability to process, they relied solely on peripheral
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information. Conversely, participants were able to distinguish and rely on strong informational
cues only when the task was important and when the information was clear, supporting the
contention that motivation and ability are necessary for fully processing information.
Thus, in the administrator-eyewitness interaction model, the ability and motivation of the
lineup administrator likely affects the sending of information cues; the ability and motivation of
the witness affects the receipt and use of information cues. An administrator will be less likely to
send cues if they are unable (e.g., they do not know who the suspect is or they are not in the
room) or unmotivated (e.g., they have doubts about the suspect’s guilt). Similarly, a witness may
not use cues if they are unable (e.g., they are distracted and do not notice them) or unmotivated
(e.g., they are confident in their non-suspect choice).
Using this ability and motivation distinction would be useful when understanding any
information transfer model, including the administrator-eyewitness interaction model. Chiefly, it
adds a simple taxonomy which aids understanding of complex social interactions between two
people, like a lineup. Additionally, many of the variables studied thus far can naturally be
categorized as ability or motivation factors. Variables like contact (e.g., Haw & Fisher, 2004)
and type of lineup (e.g., Greathouse & Kovera, 2009) had effects because they likely affected the
ability of the administrator to transfer information. The double-blind recommendation itself can
be seen as a way to control the ability of the administrator to influence the witness. Additionally,
most studies induce motivation in the administrators or witness (e.g., Greathouse & Kovera,
2009). Moreover, another study showed large double-blind administration effects by controlling
for noise inherent in motivation and memory ability (Canter et al., 2013).
Additionally, the motivation/ability distinction is useful because it highlights new areas
of research. Although some studies have focused on the administrator’s ability to send cues, very
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few have looked at the motivation to send cues. Furthermore, almost none have looked at the
witness’s ability or motivation to detect cues. If increased witness motivation increases the
detection and use of information cues—as the administrator-witness interaction model would
predict—this would be an important finding concerning the external validity of administrator
expectancy effects. One complaint about this body of research is that administrators and
witnesses in experimental settings lack the motivation of their real-world counterparts
(Mecklenburg et al., 2008). However, if witness motivation increases the impact of single-blind
administrator effects, then this criticism is inappropriate. These effects would be more—not
less—likely to occur in actual lineups.
The Current Project
Given that lineup identifications should be based on the witness’s memory alone, it is
important to understand what variables affect whether the administrator transmits cues and
whether the witness receives cues about which lineup member is the suspect. Administrator cues
about the suspect would constitute extra-legal information. Law enforcement agencies have
argued that this extra-legal influence does not occur (Mecklenburg et al., 2008) and have been
loath to adopt this practice in the United States (Greene & Evelo, 2015; Kovera & Evelo, 2017;
Police Executive Research Forum, 2013; Wise et al., 2011). By manipulating the potential flow
of information, these studies will examine when and how information transfer is occurring.
Theoretically, it is also important to understand the full expectancy model and test the usefulness
of an ability and motivation framework. Recent research has emphasized the importance of
establishing underlying models for eyewitness memory (e.g., Clark, 2012a; Meissner et al.,
2005). Finally, those not familiar with debates in the eyewitness literature might argue that the
double-blind lineup recommendation is beyond reproach. However, recent literature has begun to
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question whether the double-blind recommendation is needed in practice. Researchers have
suggested that because single-blind administration increases correct identifications of suspects,
they might be preferred or at least only rejected on procedural grounds (Mickes & Gronlund,
2017). A recent review specifically criticized the double-blind recommendation, arguing “more
data are in the shadows than in the light” (Clark 2012b, p. 282). The current project will address
these research needs in two studies that investigate the ability and motivation of administrators to
send information about which lineup member is the suspect (Cue Transmission Study) and
witnesses to receive and use that information (Cue Reception Study).
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Chapter 2: Cue Transmission Study, Study 1
Does the ability and motivation of the administrator affect the sending of information
cues to a witness? This study tests two sources of motivation when administrators have (singleblind) or do not have (double-blind) the ability to send information cues. First, we manipulated
the compensation that administrators received if their witnesses identified the suspect. Second,
we manipulated the presence of additional evidence—namely, a confession. Manipulating this
second source of motivation is useful for a few reasons. It has increased ecological validity; other
sources of evidence are actual sources of motivation for lineup administrators. In addition,
participants believed that the experimenters are working on a real case and that their decisions
would have real-world consequences on testimony from an expert witness testifying at the trial.
In addition, the motivation created by a confession ties into general theories of motivation (e.g.,
Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998) and especially motivation relevant to emerging research on the
forensic confirmation bias (Kassin et al., 2013; Smalarz et al., 2016) when legal actors are
motivated to interpret evidence based on their preconceived beliefs. Confessions are a
particularly powerful source of motivation as people often continue to believe false confessions
even in the face of fully exonerating evidence (Kassin, 2012).
Study 1 Hypotheses
We made a number of hypotheses. The first hypothesis involves administrator behavior,
the second and third involve the effect on the witness, and the fourth concerns the awareness of
both individuals.
Hypothesis 1: Decisions
The witnesses’ decisions will depend on information cues sent by the administrators
which in turn will depend on the ability and motivation of administrators to send those cues. We
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predicted that ability will moderate the effects of financial motivation and evidentiary motivation
on the witnesses’ decisions. Witnesses will be more likely to identify the suspect when the
administrator is single-blind and motivated to send cues than when the administrator is singleblind but not motivated. When the administrator is double-blind and unable to send cues,
motivation will have no effect on the witnesses’ decision. A three-way interaction may also
occur with motivations having a multiplicative effect, rather than additive, in the single-blind
condition.
Hypothesis 2: Administrator Behavior
The administrators’ behaviors will show a similar pattern; administrators will show
increases in behavior that may suggest which member of the lineup is the suspect when the
administrators are both motivated and able. Furthermore, the administrators’ behavior will
mediate the effect of ability on the witnesses’ decisions. Single-blind expectations will increase
suspect specific behavior which will increase identifications of the suspect.
Hypothesis 3: Confidence
In line with other research (Charman & Quiroz, 2016), we predicted that the witnesses’
confidence will depend on whether the information cues sent are consistent or inconsistent with
the witness’s choice. Single-blind informational cues will increase the witnesses’ confidence
when the witnesses select the suspect but decrease confidence when the witnesses do not select
the suspect.
Hypothesis 4: Awareness
Consistent with past research, we predicted that both witnesses and administrators will
generally be unaware of biasing behavior and the transfer of information in single-blind
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conditions. However, we also predicted that if awareness does occur, it will be more likely to
occur in high motivation conditions.
Study 1 Method
Design
This experiment used a 2 (evidence motivation: no confession versus confession) × 2
(monetary motivation: no reward versus $25 reward) × 2 (administrator knowledge: double-blind
versus single-blind) between-subjects design. The unit of analysis are administrator-witness
dyads. We randomly assigned participants to roles and conditions.
Participants
We recruited 694 participants using two of methods: online personal adverts and inperson recruitment (see Appendix A). The participants came from both the local urban
community and the John Jay student population. All participants received $20 for volunteering.
Students could also earn class credit.
A number of participants were excluded from the data set because of a failed suspicion
check (n = 26), because a participant knew they were being recorded and identified the hidden
camera (n = 6), because the participant had already participated in this study once (n = 10), or
because of an experimenter error in failing to deliver the correct protocol (n = 12). These
exclusions left a final sample of 640 participants. We assigned participants to play the role of
either a mock witness or mock experimenter. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 71 and were
skewed to the right (Mdn = 24), reflecting the mix of students and community members.
Participant frequencies for gender, race, ethnicity, and education are presented in Table 1.
Participant demographic data did not differ between roles (all ps > .15) and was representative of
the local populations.
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Materials
Experimental Room. The laboratory space was a small room containing tables, chairs,
and storage cabinets. An iMac with a 14-inch screen displayed both the mock crime video and
the administrator training video. Participants sat approximately 3 feet away from the screen. The
administrator conducted the lineup on a narrow table. One of the short sides of the table was
pressed against a wall; the witness and administrator always sat on the long sides of the table
opposite each other. The participants and lineup were clearly visible from the hidden camera
when sitting at the table.
Camera. The room was fitted with a hidden camera to record behavioral data. We used a
small pinhole camera that was hidden a clock and controllable from an adjacent room. Although
the clock functioned as clock, this functionality was disabled because it interfered with the
operation of the camera. The camera was only visible upon a close inspection of the clock.
Mock Crime Video. Each witness watched one of three mock crimes on video. Each
video was identical except that the action was performed by a different mock criminal. This
stimulus sampling was used to increase the probability that any results are not due to specific
features of the experimental materials. The mock criminals were all college age students, white
males, with dark eyes and dark hair. Each criminal wore a white t-shirt and jeans. The mock
criminals came into the room, investigated a bookshelf, and file cabinet, and a backpack, before
stealing an iPod from the backpack and leaving the room. The videos were about two and a half
minutes long, with the perpetrators face visible for approximately 45s. The video was shot from
above, at a distance of about 8 feet, and at a downward angle.
Administrator Training Video. Each administrator watched a video on how to conduct
a simultaneous lineup. After some short instructions, a John Jay security officer conducted an
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example simultaneous lineup for a potential witness. In the video, the security officer committed
three potentially biasing behaviors: adding emphasis when displaying the photo of the suspect,
asking the witness about the photo of the suspect, and asking the witness to think about the
perpetrator from a different angle. There was no indication that these behaviors were potentially
biasing, and participants were told that they could conduct the lineup in any way they saw fit
whether the behavior was shown in the video or not. The only limitation on potential behaviors
was that administrators were told that they could not blatantly tell the witness which photo was
the suspect.
Lineup. We created a total of three lineups, one for each perpetrator. All lineups were
simultaneous and perpetrator-absent with a designated innocent suspect. The designated innocent
suspect was always in a different position. Each photo was a foreword facing headshot of the
neck and face on a white background. No clothes were visible. The photos were printed in color
on 4” × 6” glossy photo paper, labeled as Photo #1-6 on the front and back, and placed in an
envelope. The photos were not connected, allowing the participants to manipulate or move
individual photos.
We conducted extensive online pretesting to select the photos and to ensure each lineup
was fair. For the first phase of pretesting, we obtained similarity ratings for potential fillers and
designated innocent suspects. The pool of potential fillers consisted of 21 photos used by our
research group on past occasions matching the general description of our perpetrators. We used
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT; https://www.mturk.com/) to recruit 840 participants. Each
participant was presented with a photo of the perpetrator from the video and one of the 21
potential fillers. The participants then rated the similarity of the two photos on a scale from 1
(not at all similar) to 7 (completely similar). We used the photo that was rated the most similar

26

as the designated innocent suspect. Fillers were randomly selected from the reaming photos with
the stipulation that their similarity rating be above the median rating for that target and that no
photo was used in every lineup (see Figure 3)
The second phase of pretesting ensured that the lineups were fair using the mock witness
paradigm, which has predictive validity (Malpass et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2020). Using AMT, we
recruited 198 participants and—after giving them a description of the suspect—asked them to
guess which photo depicted the suspect. The lineup fairness results are in Table 2, with
functional sizes greater than 7.33, effective sizes greater than 3.91, and Tredoux’s E values
greater than 3.51. The numbers indicate that—a priori—the lineups were generally fair, that no
one stood out, and there were multiple good choices. The same statistics for the resultant lineups
are presented in Table 3 (see Quigley-McBride & Wells, 2020). These figures, calculated from
the actual lineup results from the unbiased conditions, indicate that there was a decrease in lineup
fairness moving from the mock witness paradigm to the actual study, which was most
pronounced in one of the lineups.
Lineup Identification Form. All administrators were given a one-sided lineup
identification form. The first half asked the administrator to check a box to indicate which photo,
if any, the witness chose. There were 7 choices: 6 labeled with photo numbers and 1 labeled
“The witness did not identify any photo.” The second half of the identification form dealt with
confidence that the witness had made the correct decision (regardless of whether they identified a
photo or not). First, the instructions told the administrator to obtain the confidence of the witness
in the witness’s own words; second, the instructions told the administrator to obtain the
confidence of the witness on a scale from 0% (not at all confident) to 100 (completely
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confident). There was space after each instruction for the administrator to write the witness’s
response.
Filler Task. Between watching the mock crime video and the lineup, witnesses
completed a filler task. This task consisted of two word-search puzzles (see Appendix B). Each
one was printed on a separate page and the two pages were stapled together. Each word search
contained 43 words, which could be hidden in any direction.
Participant Questionnaires. Both administrator and witness participants received a postlineup questionnaire, which was modified from past research (e.g., Greathouse & Kovera, 2009).
The administrators’ version (see Appendix C) included an administrator bias survey of six
statements pertaining to the potential bias administrators thought they exerted during the lineup
experience (e.g., “I was fair and impartial throughout the lineup.”). The administratorparticipants rated these statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
The items showed acceptable reliability (α = .69) and were averaged to form a scale where
higher scores (after reverse coding of three items) more bias in the lineup as rated by the
administrator themselves.
The witnesses’ version of the post-lineup questionnaire (see Appendix D) measured both
perceived bias and meta-cognitions about their memory of the staged crime. The witness bias
survey includes six items similar to the administrators’ items but reworded to measure the
witnesses’ perceptions of the administrators’ potentially biasing behavior (e.g., “The
administrator of this lineup was fair and impartial throughout the lineup administration.”) The
witness rated these items on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The items
showed acceptable reliability (α = .73) and were averaged to create a scale score where higher
average scores indicating that witnesses viewed their administrators as more biased. Witnesses
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also respond to a witness memory survey—nine items about their meta-cognitions for the
witnessed event (e.g., “During the video I had a good view of the perpetrator”, “I felt it was easy
to make an identification”), which the witnesses rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6
(strongly disagree). The items showed good reliability (α = .85) and were average to create scale
scores where higher scores indicated more trust in cognition. Also related to meta-cognitions, the
witnesses answered two open ended items: a) “During the video, how far away was the
perpetrator from the camera” and b) “During the video, how long was the perpetrator’s face in
your view.” Finally, witnesses answered whether they thought the administrator knew which
member of the lineup was the suspect.
Both versions of the questionnaire also collected demographic information (see Appendix
C & D). The demographic survey included four items regarding age, gender, race/ethnicity, and
education.
Procedure
Participants arrived at our laboratory separately, two at a time. A research assistant (RA)
greeted the participants and took them into the experimental room (script in Appendix E). After
obtaining informed consent (see Appendix F), the RA asked the participants to draw numbers
from a bowl. The participant-witness stayed in the room while the RA took the participantadministrator to a desk that was a short distance down the hall. The RA told the administrator
that they could do the filler task while they waited. The RA returned to the experimental room
where the witness was waiting. The RA told the witness that the task was to watch a short video
and to pay attention because they would be asked questions about it later. The RA then played
the mock crime video. When the video was done, the RA informed the witness that they had just
seen a crime, that the research team was interested in their memory for the event, and that in a
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short time they would try to identify the culprit from a lineup conducted by the participant
administrator. The RA also asked the witness not to discuss what was on the video with the other
participant.
Administrator training occurred next. The RA took the witness down the hall so that the
witness and the administrator could switch places. Before returning to the experimental room
with the administrator, the RA asked the witness to complete the filler task at the desk, and
specifically mentioned that the researchers were interested in how many words the witness could
find in the word-search. Once back in the experimental room, the RA told the administrator that
the researchers were consulting with the Manhattan District Attorney on a criminal case, that the
other participant had just witnessed a crime caught on security footage, and that it would be the
administrator’s job to conduct a six-person photo lineup. The RA led the administrator to believe
that this was a real case and that the results would help inform expert opinion and sworn
testimony about the case. The RA told the administrator that there was a real suspect in custody
and that they should try and get the witness to identify this suspect. Every administrator was told
that the suspect was charged with robbery, burglary, and assault; in the confession motivation
condition, the administrator was also told that the suspect had confessed to these crimes.
At this point, the training began regarding how to conduct the lineup. The RA first
showed the administrator the administrator training video. After the video was over, the RA sat
at the desk with the administrator to go over the lineup itself. The RA demonstrated how to
remove the photos, display the photos for the witness, mark the identification form, and gather
confidence ratings. The final manipulations came during these instructions. For single-blind
lineups, the RA told the administrator which photo was of the suspect; for double-blind lineups,
the RA told the administrator that there was a suspect in the lineup but did not identify which
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photo. In the motivation condition, the administrators were told that they would earn an extra
$25-dollar reward (i.e., in addition to their $20 compensation) if the witness identified the
suspect; administrators in the unmotivated condition were not offered any extra compensation.
After answering any questions, the RA left the administrator in the experimental room
and went to the witness in the hallway waiting area. The RA collected the crossword and
informed the witness that the lineup—conducted by the other participant—was about to begin.
The RA then read the lineup instructions that included a change of appearance instruction (to
induce choosing) and instructions that the culprit may or may not be present. Furthermore, the
RA informed the witness that there is a suspect but that the administrator either does (singleblind) or does not (double-blind) know which photo depicts the suspect (see also Dysart et al.,
2012).
After answering any remaining questions, the RA brought the witness into the
experimental room to join the administrator. The RA informed both the witness and the
administrator that she would be outside and to please let her know when the lineup was
complete. The RA then closed the door behind her and remained in the hallway for the remainder
of the lineup. When the participants indicated they were finished, the RA reentered the room and
made sure the identification form was complete. If it was not complete, she redirected the
administrator to complete the form and left the room again. Once the identification form was
complete, the RA handed the administrator and the witness their respective questionnaires. The
RA then separated the two, allowing the witness to complete the forms alone in the experimental
room and allowing the administrator to complete the forms alone in the hallway waiting area.
When the participants had finished their forms, the research manager—who was
responsible for overseeing the study—brought the administrator and witness back together in the
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experimental room to do a joint debrief. The research manager probed for suspicion of the
manipulated variables and knowledge of the secret camera. The research manager then informed
both participants about the goal of the experiment and the manipulations. The research manager
revealed the deception regarding the nature of the case and materials, and the administrator was
assured that this data was not to be used in a real case. Both participants were told about the
hidden camera and the reason for surreptitious video recording. The research manager gave the
participants three choices regarding the use of the videos: delete the video, give consent for it to
be used in this research, or give consent for it to be used in this research, future research, data
repositories, and future research. The participants signed a consent form indicating their choice
(see Appendix G). Videos were only kept, used, and uploaded to the Open Science Framework if
both participants gave the appropriate level of consent. Finally, the research manager
compensated the participants and gave the reward to the administrator if applicable.
Study 1 Results
We present an analysis of the results in the order of the expectancy process. First, we
present an analysis of the manipulation checks and the video coding procedures. Second, we
present an analysis of the administrators’ behaviors: ratings of applied pressure, enumerated
administrator behaviors, and administrator survey ratings. Third and finally we present an
analysis of the witnesses’ behaviors: witness choice, witness confidence, witness survey ratings,
witness switching behavior. Cohen’s d is presented for tests between means and partial etasquared is presented for higher order effects. Missing data is deleted pairwise.
Manipulation Check
Administrators were asked two critical manipulation check questions regarding the
motivation manipulations. We excluded participants a total of 69 participants who answered
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these questions incorrectly: 37 failed the confession check, 24 failed the reward check, and 8
failed both. This left 251 dyads for comparison.
Videos and Coding Reliability
Of the 251 remaining videos, only 228 could be analyzed. 17 were deleted during posthoc video informed consent by the participant. Six were removed because of technically
difficulties including un-synced sound or failure to record the entire lineup.
Two coders watched the lineup videos and coded a number of variables related to the
length and pressure of the lineup (see Appendix H). The coders showed good reliability overall.
There was high agreement on when the lineup started, r(226) = .93¸ p < .01, and when the lineup
ended, r(224) = .84, p < .01. There was also agreement on the amount of overall pressure in a
lineup, r(209) = .45, p < .01. Finally, the coders tended to agree on the pressure toward the
suspect regardless of position in the lineup: Position 3, r(74) = .58, p < 01; Position 4, r(76) =
.39, p < .01; Position 5, r(66) = .37, p < .01. Coders had poor agreement (average r = .11, min r =
-.15, max r = .64) when rating pressure toward or away from fillers.
Coders also indicated the presence of absence of 24 administrator behaviors and 2
witness behaviors. We calculated a Cohen’s Kappa for each behavior. Three behaviors did not
have a significant level of agreement—adding emphasis, showing pleasure, and showing
displeasure—and were removed from further analysis. A fourth behavior—administrators
mentioning that the suspect confessed—was also removed because no coder indicated that it
occurred. The remaining variables showed acceptable reliability, with an average Kappa of .46
and ranging from a minimum of .17 to a maximum of .80. A third coder reconciled any
differences between the initial coders.
Administrator Behavior
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Ratings of Applied Pressure. Two coders rated each video on the overall pressure to
choose a photo on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). We averaged these scores across
each coder and attempted to predict these values from an ANOVA of the full model. The only
significant effect was a main effect of financial motivation, F(1, 203) = 16.28, p < .01, η2 = .07 .
Average pressure was rated as higher when administrators were offered a reward (M = 2.50, SD
= 0.92) compared to no reward (M = 2.00, SD = 0.81). The higher amount of pressure used by
nonblind administrators was also reflected in an increase in the time lineup took. We averaged
each coder’s estimate of the lineup start and end times. We used this score to create a lineup
length variable, measured in seconds. Due to a right skew in the overall time variable for each
line, we tested for non-parametric main effects using three Mann-Whitney U tests. The only
significant effect was for financial motivation, U = 4930.00, Z = -2.87, p < .01. Lineups were
shorter when no reward was offered (Mdn = 100.0, IQR = 67.5) and longer when a reward was
offered (Mdn = 135.0, IQR = 116.0).
Contrary to our hypothesis, there was no clear evidence that this pressure was applied
more to the suspect in single-blind lineups. To test this hypothesis, we created a binary
variable—based on suspect specific pressure ratings averaged across coders—to indicate whether
the suspect received the most pressure out of any other photo. The suspect received the most
pressure in only 17(7%) of the 251 lineup videos. This low cell count made it impossible to
interpret higher order interactions between the variables using a binary logistic regression.
Because of this, the main effects here should be interpreted with caution—that is, it may be given
more power that these main effects would be qualified or better explained by a higher order
interaction. However, we present the data here, because they may help explain the overall lack of
significant results (see discussion). There was a statistically significant main effect of financial
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motivation, β(1) = 1.10, p = .046, OR = 3.02, and marginally significant effect of administrator
knowledge, β(1) = 1.01, p = .089, OR = 2.75. The odds ratio here indicates that the suspect was
more likely to receive the most pressure when the administrator was offered a reward, and
separately when the administrator knew which member of the lineup was the suspect.
The effect of reward motivation carried over into the ability of the coders to guess which
photo was the suspect. We created a continuous variable representing the number of coders who
guessed the suspect which ranged from zero to two. Using a full model ANOVA to predict the
number of coders who guessed the suspect, we found a significant main effect of financial
motivation, F(1, 243) = 4.93, p = .03, η2 = .20. More coders were able to correctly guess the
suspect when the administrator had been offered a reward (M = 0.40, SD = 0.69) than when the
administrator had not been offered a reward (M = 0.23, SD = 0.54).
Enumerated Administrator Behaviors. To analyze the actual behaviors displayed by
the administrators, we first created a total behavior variable by summing across the 20 reliable
coding categories (see Table 4). This summation resulted in a variable—potential ranging from 0
to 20—with higher scores indicating that the administrator engaged in more potential biasing
behaviors at least once. The actual total behavior variable had a mean of 3.5 (SD = 2.4) and
ranged from zero to 12, with some slight right skewness. A full model ANOVA revealed only a
main effect of financial motivation, F(1, 220) = 11. 04, p < .01, η2 = .05. Administrators offered
a reward exhibited more potential biasing behaviors (M = 4.06, SD = 2.55) than did
administrators who were not offered a reward (M = 2.96, SD = 2.16). There were no other
significant main effects or interactions.
We also completed a planned comparison between single-blind and double-blind
conditions for every behavior. Only two behaviors differed significantly between groups. The
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first was that administrators in single blind lineups (n = 1) were less likely than administrators in
double-blind lineups (n = 7) to say that they did not know which photo was of the suspect. The
second was that, out of 17 administrators who stated “you seem to be looking at this photo a long
time”, administrators in single-blind lineups tended to say this significantly more often (n = 13)
than did administrators in double-blind lineup (n = 4), χ2(1) = 3.893, p = .048, φ = .13.
Finally, we analyzed whether behaviors were differentially targeting the suspect. Item 615 were all administrator behaviors which could be targeted at a specific photo (see Table 5).
This made it possible to analyze whether the single-blind administrators were more likely to
target suspects, fillers, or both. However, there were no significant differences between singleblind and double-blind administrators in the types of photos that they targeted (see Table 5).
Administrator Survey. After the lineup, administrators filled out a survey about whether
they thought they had biased or tainted the lineup procedure. Scores were averaged across six
items after reverse coding so that higher scores indicated more perceived bias. The scores ranged
from 1 to 5, with a mean of 2.22 (SD = 0.84), indicating the most administrators did not think
they biased the lineup. An ANOVA found no significant main effects or interactions when
predicting the average bias score from the full model.
Witness Behavior
Witness Choice. Out of 251 lineups, witnesses identified the suspect 47 times (19%),
identified a filler 167 times (67%), and rejected the lineup 37 times (15%). Given that all lineups
were target absent, this means that 15% of witnesses made the correct choice.
The witnesses’ choices are broken down by all independent variables in Table 6. We used
the full model to predict binary classifications of the witnesses’ decisions: suspect versus nonsuspect, filler vs. non-filler, and rejection vs non-rejection. We entered main effects, two-way
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interaction, and the three-way interaction separately in individual blocks. Contrary to our
hypotheses, there were no significant effects at any stage for any of the three decision models.
Witness Confidence. Considering the information cue model of lineup influence, the
effect of administrator knowledge on confidence should depend on whether that information is
consistent with the choice of the witness. Single-blind administrators should increase the
confidence of witnesses who choose the suspect because they will communicate information that
the witness made the right choice; single-blind administrators should decrease the confidence of
witnesses who choose a filler because the administrator will communicate information that the
witness made the wrong choice.
To test this hypothesis, we ran an ANOVA to predict confidence from witness choice and
administrator knowledge. Contrary to our hypotheses there was no interaction, F(1, 244) = 0.01,
p = .93, η2 < .01. There were also no main effect of either administrator knowledge, F(1, 244) =
1.61, p = .21, η2 < .01, or suspect identification, F(1, 244) = 0.38, p = .54, η2 < .01. An ANOVA
including both confidence variables produced similar results; there were no significant
interactions involving both suspect choice and administrator knowledge.
Witness Survey Ratings. Witness ratings showed a consistent pattern of non-significant
results. We used the full model ANOVA to predict the witness meta-cognition average scale
score, the witness perceived lineup bias average scale score, the witnesses’ estimations of
distance to the perpetrator, and the witnesses’ estimations of the time the perpetrator was visible.
There were no significant main effects or interactions (all ps > .09).
Witness Switching Behavior. Coders indicated that only 25 witnesses changed their
decision and 15 changed their confidence level. We attempted to predict these outcomes with a
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binary logistic regression. The variables in the full model were unable to predict witness
switching behavior for either choice or confidence (all ps > .31)
Study 1 Discussion
We found no support for our hypotheses in this study. Primarily, administrator
knowledge did not interact with motivation when it was manipulated through a reward nor when
it was manipulated through the presence of a confession. There was also no main effect of
administrator knowledge. Without differential behavior in the administrator, it is somewhat not
surprising that there was no differential behavior in the witnesses, either in what the witnesses
chose or the witnesses’ confidence in that choice.
The lack of administrator knowledge effects in this study is surprising, given the effects
found throughout the literature (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). One possible explanation is that the
majority of administrators were hypermotivated to get an identification. Administrators might
behave this way because of the motivation conditions, or some other aspect of the study, such as
the apparent “real case” or the wording of the administrator condition. If this were the case,
administrators in both single- and double-blind lineups may have put pressure on the witness to
pick someone rather than reject the lineup. The most consistent finding was in fact that
administrators offered a reward seemed to put a great deal of pressure on their witnesses to pick
someone. This finding may have been the result of a lottery type mentality (e.g., “you can’t win
if you don’t play”) with blind administrators putting pressure on witnesses to not reject the
lineup whereas nonblind administrators put pressure on the witness to not reject the lineup and to
pick the suspect. Due to the reward, nonblind administrators—unlike real detectives or witness
participants in other studies—may have preferred filler identifications to rejections. If all
administrators put a great deal of pressure on the witness to pick someone, there would not be
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much variance left for administrator blindness to produce the traditional filler-to-suspect shift.
Evidence for this explanation exists in the overall high amount of lineup identifications (85%)
versus rejections (15%), especially considering that all lineups were culprit-absent.
Another possible explanation, is that some administrators were under—not over—
motivated. Past studies (e.g., Zimmerman et al., 2017) have offered some form of base
motivation to administrators to help simulate real law enforcement administrators—individuals
who are motivated to get identifications of the suspect. Administrators randomly assigned to
single-blind lineups and no reward manipulation were probably not sufficiently motivated to
send any cues, which may have eliminated any effect of administrator knowledge. In hindsight,
an improvement to the design would have offered a reward to all participants to get an
identification of the suspect and to manipulate the size of this reward between low and high
motivation conditions.
A final possible explanation for the lack of administrator knowledge effects may be that
witnesses were not motivated to use the cues sent by administrators. In this study, and unlike past
studies (e.g., Zimmerman et al., 2017), both participants were randomly assigned to condition
together. Because the random assignment occurred in the same room, witness participants were
aware that the administrator was not a lab member and that the administrator was untrained. This
knowledge may have diminished the administrators’ authority in the eyes of the witnesses and
made their influence less effectual.
We do see a hint of administrator effects in the fact that administrators offered reward
motivation were more likely to put suspect specific pressure on the witness as well. Given the
experimental control, this finding does not make sense unless there is also an effect of
administrator knowledge. How else could administrators know who the suspect is? Importantly,
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suspect specific pressure was also the only variable to even show a marginal effect of
administrator knowledge. This finding suggests another possible explanation for the lack of
replication in this study: low power. The a priori power analyses indicated that 280 participants
should be sufficient to detect the given effects if present. We added a 40 dyad cushion to protect
this number from missing data. This cushion however was not sufficient; the sample sized was
significantly lowered after removing 69 dyads due to the failure of the manipulation check and
17 more videos due to informed consent and technical difficulties. We addressed this issue
specifically in Study 2 by making sure each participant passed the manipulation check before
counting them toward the total.
We incorporated this last lesson specifically into the next study. The critical manipulation
checks were performed while the study was ongoing. This practice allowed the research staff to
replace participants who failed the manipulation check to ensure the study would have enough
power.
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Chapter 3: Cue Reception Study, Study 2
Does the ability and motivation of the witness affect how much information is received
and used during lineups? Study 2 transitions from looking at administrator factors to witness
factors (e.g., can the effect of administrator influence be increased or decreased with motivation
and ability variables). Here, we used a steering eyewitness paradigm to ensure that half of the
administrators were attempting to influence the witnesses to choose the suspect. We then
attempted to increase witnesses’ motivation to use this information provided by the administrator
by offering them a reward to identify the suspect ($25 versus $0) or to decrease their ability to
use this information by manipulating cognitive load (high versus low).
Study 2 Hypotheses
We posit two hypotheses. The first regards the witnesses’ decisions; the second regards
the witnesses’ confidence.
Hypothesis 1: Decisions
Participant witnesses will be more likely to detect and use information from the
administrator when they are motivated and able. Specifically, we predict a three-way interaction
between administrator steering, witness ability, and witness motivation. The witnesses’ ability
should moderate the interaction between the witnesses’ motivation and administrators’ steering.
When the witnesses’ ability to pick up on informational cues is low (due to high cognitive load)
there will be no interaction between steering and motivation on the number of identifications of
the suspect. However, when the witness has the ability to pick up on informational cues (due to
high cognitive load) there will be an interaction between steering and motivation. The witnesses’
motivation to pick the suspect should have no effect when there is no steering—and therefore no
information. However, there should be an increase in the number of identifications of the suspect
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if the administrators are steering and the witnesses are motivated (versus not motivated) to detect
and use the cues.
Hypothesis 2: Confidence
We predict that the witnesses’ confidence will depend on the administrators steering and
the witnesses’ choice. Single-blind informational cues will increase the witnesses’ confidence
when the witnesses select the suspect but decrease confidence when the witnesses do not select
the suspect.
Study 2 Method
Design
This experiment used a 2 (witness ability: high cognitive load versus low cognitive load)
× 2 (witness motivation: no reward versus $25 reward) × 2 (steering: no steering versus steering)
between-subjects design. We randomly assigned participants to roles and conditions.
Participants
We recruited 317 participants from online personal advertisements (see Appendix A). All
participants received at least $20 for participating.
A number of participants were excluded for failing the manipulation check in different
ways. The critical manipulation check question asked whether the participants noticed the
financial motivation manipulation. We excluded three participants who left this item blank, 11
participants who incorrectly indicated that they were not offered money, five participants who
were unable to specify the correct amount they were offered, and one participant who incorrectly
said they were offered compensation. We did not exclude two participants in the no witness
motivation condition who incorrectly indicated that they were offered a $20 reward—likely
because these participants confused the base compensation with a reward.
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In total, 20 participants failed the manipulation check. We removed another four
participants for failing the suspicion checks and another 14 participants because there was an
experimenter error when delivering the assigned protocol. After these eliminations, there were
279 participants available for analysis. All data exclusions were determined before the primary
analyses were conducted.
The remaining participants reflected the demographics of the local area. The average
participant age was 38.76 (SD = 14.26, min = 18, max = 79). One hundred thirty-two participants
identified as female, 145 identified as male, and one identified as transgender. The racial makeup
was diverse (Asian = 12%, Black or African American = 32%, Hispanic, Latino, or Latina =
13%. White = 33%, Other/Mixed = 10%). Thirty-three percent of participants reported having
earned a high school degree or less; 67% of participants reported having a college degree or
higher.
Materials
For the Study 2, we used the same experimental room, camera, mock crime videos,
lineup identification form, and filler task as were used in Study 1. The lineup and the witness
survey were modified to make them appropriate for this study. Finally, we added an audio
distraction task that served as the cognitive load manipulation. These new and modified materials
are explained below.
Lineup. The same photos were used for the lineups, and all three remained culpritabsent. For this study, the designated innocent suspect was placed in Position 2. This change was
done to facilitate steering and limit confusion among RAs when stimulus sampling. The photos
were printed on similar 4” × 6” glossy photo paper and remained loose, stored in an envelope.
The photos were labeled “Photo 1-6” on the back as well as the front.
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Participant Questionnaires. The witnesses received a post-lineup questionnaire similar
to that used in Study 1 (see Appendix I). Participants completed the same 6-item witness bias
survey (α = .84) and the same 9-item witness memory survey (α = .84). Scale scores were
calculated for the witness bias survey and the witness memory survey by averaging across items
so that higher scores indicated more bias and better ratings of memory, respectively. The
questionaries’ also contained the two open ended items about viewing time (“During the video,
how long was the perpetrator’s face in your view”) and viewing distance (“During the video,
how far away was the perpetrator from the camera.”)
After these questionnaires were a number of manipulation check questions between the
viewing conditions questions and the demographic survey. We asked three yes/no questions
regarding whether they thought the administrator knew which photo was the suspect, whether
they were told the importance of the task, and whether they were offered additional money for
identifying the suspect. We also asked the participants to rate the difficulty of the task and their
motivation to complete the task on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all difficult/motivated) to
6 (extremely difficult/motivated). The only manipulation check that was critical was the question
about compensation.
The participant questionnaires ended with the same demographic questions asked in
Study 1. This demographic survey is located in Appendix I.
Audio Distraction Task. Finally, we created an audio distraction task to manipulate
cognitive load. During the audio task, participants listened to a series of tones on an audio track.
The tones were all the sinusoidal tones of the same pitch and volume, similar to a hearing test.
The tones sounded at varying intervals with only one tone sounding at a time, followed by a rest
(always at least a one second pause) until the next tone. The audio track was stored and played
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by a small portable music device. Participants listened to the audio track using “ear-bud” type
disposable headphones provided by the researchers.
We manipulated cognitive load during the task by varying the complexity of each track.
For low cognitive load, we created the simple track. The simple track had only six tones per
minute. The tones were randomly placed within each minute so there was no discernable pattern.
For high cognitive, we create the complex track. The complex track had 12 tones per minute.
These were again randomly placed within each minute. To increase distraction, the track also
contained background static, making the tones harder to hear and any instructions harder to hear.
In addition to this distraction, we also increased cognitive load by asking participants to count
the number of tones during the complex task. Pretesting was used to ensure the complex track
created a more difficult task than the simple track, and that participants could still perform other
duties (i.e., a lineup) while listening to the tracks.
Both the simple and complex track were 30 minutes long to ensure no participant ever
reached the end. Both tracks also started with a male voice saying, “This is an official trial,
beginning in three, two, one.” The instructions were included to help the experimenters check the
volume and to make sure that the participants heard the first tone.
We also created a practice track. The RAs used this track to acquaint the participants
with the task, to make sure the headphones were working, and to adjust the volume if needed.
This track was 60 seconds long. It included four tones and no static. The track played after a
male voice said, “This is a practice trial, beginning in three, two, one.” All participants heard the
practice track, regardless of condition.
Procedure
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A script of the procedure is presented in Appendix J. The protocol involved three
different roles played by the research staff. The research assistant (RA) was either a male or
female undergraduate student in charge of guiding the participants through the protocol. The
lineup administrator was female graduate or undergraduate student who—after extensive
training—conducted the lineups. The research manager was a male or female graduate student in
charge of supervising the study, ensuring the staff followed the protocol, and debriefing the
participants.
Where possible, research staff was blind. RAs were blind to the steering condition and
the hypothesis of the study. Lineup administrators were blind to the motivation condition, the
cognitive load condition, the fact that no lineups contained the perpetrator, and the hypothesis of
the study. The research managers were not blind to any information and therefore only interacted
with the participants after the measures were collected.
Setup Phase. The RA greeted participants as they arrived to the lab and took the
participant into the experimental room. After obtaining informed consent (see Appendix K), the
RA played the mock crime video for the participant. After the video was over, the RA informed
the participant that they had just witnessed a crime and that the researchers were interested in the
participant’s memory for the culprit. The RA also informed the participant that—in addition to
the lineup—they would need to complete three ostensible “memory and attention” tasks, to
measure their underlying cognitive ability. These tasks served as a cover story for different
aspects of the experiment.
A word-search puzzle was the first memory and attention task. Like in Study 1, the wordsearch consisted of two puzzles on two pages, stapled. The RA first gave the participant the
instructions, told the participant how to find the words, and specifically mentioned that the
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researchers were interested in the number of words that the participant could find in five minutes.
The word-search was actually a filler task to ensure that the participant did not rehearse the
perpetrator’s face during the time between watching the crime video and the lineup
administration. The RA instructed the participant to begin the word-search and—at the same
time—flipped over a five-minute sand-timer, visible to the participant. When the timer was
finished, the RA instructed the participant to stop and then collected the word-search.
The audio task was the second memory and attention task and took place at the same time
as the lineup. In a short instruction session (approx. 5 min), the RA gave a series of instructions
about completing these tasks at the same time, including that a different individual (i.e., the
lineup administrator) would conduct the lineup after the RA left the room, that the lineup
administrator had a suspect in the crime, and that the lineup administrator was interested in
whether the participant could identify that suspect. The RA also gave the participant headphones,
completed the practice track, and made sure that the participant could hear both the tones and
any further instructions. The music device was set to a preferred volume and only adjusted up as
needed.
During this information and practice session, the RA also delivered the motivation and
cognitive load manipulations. In the reward motivation condition, the RA informed the
participant that they would get an additional $25 if they identified the suspect (RA training and
monitoring ensured that the word suspect was used, and not culprit). No extra instructions were
given in the no-reward motivation condition. In the low cognitive load condition, the RA told the
participant to simply to listen to the tones play while the lineup took place. In the high cognitive
load condition, the RA told the participant to keep track of how many tones they heard, and to be
able to report that number at a later time. The RA also manipulated cognitive load by playing the
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appropriate simple or complex track for participants in the low or high cognitive load conditions
respectively.
After the RA was finished with the instruction and practice session, there was a short
question opportunity to make sure that the participant understood the lineup and audio tone task.
If the participant had no questions or when the RA had answered all questions, the RA began the
track and left the room.
Lineup Phase. Approximately 10 to 30 seconds after the RA left the room, the lineup
administrator would enter, introduce themselves, and read a short set of instructions before
beginning the lineup. The instructions included wording that the culprit may not be present. The
instructions also included appearance change instructions intended to lower criterion and
increase choosing. Finally, the instructions included a warning that the administrator would
obtain their confidence regardless of their decision, per new recommended best practices (Wells
et al., 2020). If the participant took off the earphones during these instructions or during the
lineup, the lineup administrator politely told the participant to put the headphones back on and
keep them on for the remainder of the lineup.
The administrator then began the lineup. In the no-steering condition, the administrator
laid out all six photos, remained still, and did not speak until the participant made a choice. The
administrator then wrote down that choice, obtained the confidence rating, removed the photos,
and left the room. In the rare instance that the participant did not make a decision—usually
because they were busy counting tones or did not know that they should vocalize the choice—the
administrator would remain still and unspeaking for approximately 10 minutes. After an
estimated ten minutes had elapsed, the administrator would then prompt the participant as to
whether they were confused or needed to hear the instructions again. In all cases, this minimal
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prompting solved any confusion and the lineup would end with the participant voicing a
decision.
In the steering condition, the lineup administrator followed a script (see Appendix L).
The script itself involved a number of behaviors and interrogation tools designed to get the
participant to realize that the suspect was in Position 2 and to pick that photo. First, the script
contained a number of behaviors that the administrator always did in relation to Photo 2.
Whenever the administrator touched Photo 2, she tapped it twice. Furthermore, when the
participant mentioned Photo 2, the administrator would look happy, nod, and ostensibly write
down notes about what the participant was saying on the identification form. The administrator
would look unhappy, use vocal hedges (e.g., an elongated “…okay…”), and not write down any
notes when talking about other photos.
If the participant picked Photo 2, the steering administrator would congratulate the
participant on a good job and get the participant’s confidence. If the participant did not choose
Photo 2, or had not chosen anyone after 10 seconds, the participant would switch to using three
interrogation tools—tools designed to try to get the participant to talk about, and then pick Photo
2. The three tools in the interrogation toolbox included “Prodding”, “Elimination”, and “Suggest
Alternatives.” During prodding, the administrator would ask general but leading questions (e.g.,
“Is there anyone who looks most like the culprit?”). During elimination, the administrator would
remove fillers if the participant indicated the filler was not the culprit or requested the photos to
be removed. The administrator would never remove Photo 2 and would not return fillers once
eliminated. Finally, during suggest alternatives, the administrator would ask the participant to
compare a subset of the photos, including Photo 2 (e.g., “what about these three stand out?).
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The administrator was encouraged to use these tools in any order that seemed
appropriate, with any of multiple suggested interrogation questions. If an interrogation tool got
the participant talking about Photo 2, the administrator would then attempt to push the
participant to make that decision and secure an ID of the suspect. If a tool did not work, the
administrator would switch to another tool. Administrators could use a tool as many times as
they saw fit given the progression of the lineup, but they were required to use all three at least
once before ending the lineup. If it appeared that an ID of Photo 2 was unlikely, the
administrator attempted to obtain a lineup rejection instead of an ID of a filler. This aspect of the
script simulated a law enforcement officer attempting to preserve a witness for future lineups.
Once the administrator had used all three tools at least once, the administrator could allow a
lineup rejection or filler identification only after showing displeasure at the participant’s choice
and providing three prompts to get the participant to consider the lineup again (e.g., “Okay, are
you sure? Why don’t you look again?”). The administrator would then clean up the photos and
leave the room.
Final Phase. After the lineup was complete, the RA would reenter the room and stop the
audio task. In the high cognitive load condition, the RA would ask the participant to report the
number of tones they heard. In the low cognitive load condition, the RA would ask the
participant to guess how many tones they heard. The RA would then record both the amount of
time the track played and the number of tones reported.
The RA then explained that the third and final memory and attention task was a survey
about what the participant experienced. The RA then gave the participant the witness survey and
left the room.
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When the participant had completed the survey, the research manager entered the room
and began the debriefing. The research manager probed for suspicion and then explained the
nature of the study. The research manager also explained the necessity of surreptitious video
recording and obtained consent to use the video, or the research manager deleted the video per
the participants’ instructions (See Appendix M). Finally, the research manager paid the
participant—including any applicable rewards—and ended the study.
Study 2 Results
We present, in order, an analysis of the video and coding reliability, the manipulation
checks, witness decisions, witness confidence, and witness perceptions. Cohen’s d is presented
for tests between means and partial eta-squared is presented for higher-order effects. Missing
data is deleted pairwise.
Videos and Coding Reliability
Of the 279 videos, only 254 were analyzed. Nineteen were deleted at the request of the
participant and six were removed for technically difficulties.
Two separate blind coders rated each of the videos using a simplified coding sheet (see
Appendix N). The coders timed the lineup and rated the overall pressure applied by the steering
or non-steering behavior. These relatively easy tasks showed good reliability; there was a high
degree agreement about the length of the lineup, r(247) = .995¸ p < .01, and the pressure applied
by the administrator, r(252) = .974¸ p < .01. These continuous variables were averaged for
analysis.
The coders also rated two aspects of the witnesses’ behavior; whether the witnesses
changed their lineup decision or the witnesses’ changed their confidence. The ratings of the
witnesses decisions were reliable; coders tended to agree about when a change was made, κ(252)
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= .89, p < .01, the original choice that witness made, κ(38) = .88, p < .01, and the final choice
that the witness made, κ(38) = 1.00, p < .01. However, changes to confidence were made
rarely—with all coders indicating fewer than eight occurrences—and with little, but statistically
significant, agreement as to when, κ(252) = .39, p < .01. A third blind coder reconciled
disagreements regarding changes to both decisions and confidence levels.
Manipulation Check
The critical and a priori manipulation check was only in regard to whether participants
correctly noticed the reward. Details about the removal of the data from participants who
provided incorrect responses are noted in the participant section. The remaining participants
reported a significant difference in motivation to identify the suspect, t(276) = 4.42, p < .01, d =
0.53, 95% CI [.29, .77]. As, expected, participants who were offered a reward reported that they
were more motivated to identify the suspect (M = 4.17, SD = 0.75) than did participants who
were not offered the reward (M = 3.69, SD = 1.04), although both group averages are above the
midpoint on the scale.
The audio tone task was also effective. There was a significant difference between
cognitive load conditions on task difficulty, t(277) = 10.66, p < .01, d = 1.28, 95% CI [1.02,
1.53], with participants rating the task as more difficult in the high cognitive load condition (M =
2.98, SD = 1.12) than in the low cognitive load condition (M = 1.68, SD = 0.91). There is also
evidence that—despite differences in difficulty—participants in both conditions appropriately
attended to the audio task. As expected, participants reported more tones in the high cognitive
load condition (M = 57.67, SD = 34.86) than in the low cognitive load condition, M = 20.67, SD
= 17.19, t(273) = 11.12, p < .01, d = 1.34, 95% CI [1.08, 1.60]. We also calculated the residual
scores by subtracting the reported number of tones from the actual number of tones played, so
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that positive residuals indicate overestimates and negative residuals indicate underestimates.
There was no significant difference in average residuals between high (M = -10.32, SD = 27.50)
and low (M = -6.82, SD = 17.99) cognitive load conditions, t(273) = 1.245, p = .21, d = -0.15,
95% CI [-0.39, 0.09], and—more importantly—the distribution of residuals for both groups was
normally distributed with a central tendency near zero, indicating that neither group ignored the
task.
Finally, our analysis indicated that our administrators changed their behavioral noticeably
when steering and not steering. The lineups lasted significantly longer (in seconds) when steering
was present (M = 208.45, SD = 126.73) compared to when it was not present, M = 53.17, SD =
74.55, t(247) = 11.70, p < .01, d = 1.48, 95% CI [1.20, 1.76]. Blind coders of the videos reported
more overall pressure when the administrator was steering (M = 4.49, SD = 1.06) compared to
not steering, M = 1.01, SD = 0.08, t(252) = 36.27, p < .01, d = 4.55, 95% CI [4.09, 5.01].
Witness Decisions
The participants selected the suspect 94 times (34%), a filler 122 times (44%), and
rejected the lineup 63 times (23%). These numbers are broken down by each independent
variable in Table 7. Next, we predicted these three outcomes using binary logistic regressions.
Predicting Decisions. Hypothesis 1 stated that steering would increase identifications of
the suspect at that this effect would be moderated by cognitive load (with more cognitive load
eliminating the effect) and financial motivation (with high motivation increasing the effect). To
examine witness decisions, we used three binary logistic regression to predict identifications of
the suspect versus non-suspect, identifications of fillers versus non-fillers, and lineup rejections
versus non-rejections. The full model was tested, with main effects entered first, 2-way
interactions entered second, and the three-way interaction entered last. The model results are
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present in Table 8. No predictors significantly improved the model’s prediction for
identifications of the suspect. However, Step 1 did significantly improve the model fit for
predictions of filler identifications due to a significant main effect of steering, B = -.722, Wald
χ2(1) = 8.63, p < .01, OR = 0.49, 95% CI [0.30, 0.79]. An odds ratio less than one indicates that
steering significantly decreased the number of filler identifications, which is consistent with our
training of the administrators, who were told to steer participants away from fillers. In the final
regression model to predict lineup rejections, there was again only a significant model
improvement at Step 1 due to a significant main effect of steering, B = 0.63, Wald χ2(1) = 4.53, p
= .03, OR = 1.88, 95% CI [1.05, 3.36]. Here the results indicate that steering led to significantly
more lineup rejections. Given these three results, it appears steering toward rejection was more
successful than steering toward suspects.
Although not completely consistent with the hypothesis, these results are suggestive that
steering had an effect consistent with training and the goals of the administrator. To analyze this
effect in greater detail, we broke down the witness decisions by steering (see Table 9). The
results indicate that that steering had a significant on the witness decisions, χ2(2) = 9.35, p < .01,
V = .18. The residuals in Table 9 indicate that steering led to a reduction of filler IDs and an
increase in both rejections and identifications of the suspect, albeit with a larger residual
associated with the changes in rejections versus identifications of the suspect.
Given the significant main effect of steering consistent with the hypothesis, we ran
planned comparisons to analyze the moderating effect of cognitive load and financial motivation
on steering. The results for cognitive load are presented in Table 10. When cognitive load was
low, there was a significant effect of steering, χ2(2) = 7.08, p = .03, V = .23. The residuals are
consistent with the main effect of steering. However, there was no significant effect of steering
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when cognitive load was high, χ2(2) = 3.18, p = .20, V = .15. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that cognitive load interfered with cues given by the administrator.
For the moderating effect of financial motivation, we found results opposite our
hypothesis (see Table 11). When no motivation was present, there was a significant effect of
steering, χ2(2) = 6.54, p = .04, V = .22. The residuals are consistent with the main effect of
steering. However, when offering a reward of $25 dollars, the effect of steering was no longer
significant, χ2(2) = 3.45, p = .18, V = .16. This reversal, however, may make sense in light of the
unforeseen effect and strong effect of steering on lineup rejections. In this case it may make
sense that financial motivation—offered only for identifying the suspect—would decrease the
ability of administrators to obtain identifications of fillers
Witness Decision Changes. Coders who rated the witness behavior on video were asked
to indicate if the witnesses changed their decisions; that is, did they voice one choice before
voicing a different choice for their final decision (see video coding and reliability). Overall, 47 of
254 witnesses (18.5%) switched from their initial decision. There was a strong effect of steering,
χ2(1) = 50.32, p < .01, V = .45, with 46 of the 47 (98%) switches occurring in the steering
conditions. The pattern was consistent with administrator influence; initial witness choices were
equally distributed among the suspect, fillers, and rejection but final choices were more likely to
settle on the suspect or rejection (see Figure 5). Cognitive load and financial motivation did not
moderate this effect.
Witness Confidence
We hypothesized that decision consistent cues from the administrator would increase
confidence whereas decision inconsistent cues from the administrator would decrease confidence
(Hypothesis 2). To test this hypothesis, we used a factorial ANOVA to predict confidence from
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the full model plus an additional factor to indicate whether the suspect was identified—a factor
which could account for the consistency of the steering cues. There were no statistically
significant effects at an alpha .05 level.
Witness Confidence Changes. There were very few confidence changes, and low initial
agreement on when confidence changes occurred (see reliability section). There were 6 of 254
(2.4%) participant who could be clearly classified as changing confidence after reconciliation
coding (see Table 12). Notably, all were in the steering condition. Half changed their
identification decision (all from fillers to the suspect) in addition to their confidence; half stayed
with their original witness decision (one suspect, one filler, and one lineup rejection). In every
case but one, confidence went down
Witness Perceptions
Witness answered a number of survey items about their perceptions of the procedure.
First, we present the results of the items concerning metacognition, then the results of the items
about perceived bias.
Metacognitions. Participants rated the quality of their own memory on a number of
items. First, we predicted witness metacognitive scale scores from the full model ANOVA. The
only significant effect was a main effect of steering, F(1, 271) = 7.29, p = .007, η2 = .03.
Participants self-reported they had a better memory for the crime after no steering (M = 4.28, SD
= 0.81) than after steering (M = 4.02, SD = 0.75). Participants also predicted the distance the
perpetrator in the film and how long his face was visible. For both variables, we used pairwise
removal of a number of outliers (distance n = 4, time n = 7) before predicting each outcome from
a full model ANOVA. Concerning ratings of the distance of the perpetrator, there was only a
significant main effect of influence, F(1, 257) = 4.19, p = .042, η2 = .02. The effect was similar
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to that in the metacognitive survey; participants rated the perpetrator as farther away after
steering occurred (M = 87.57 inches, SD = 37.58 inches) compared to after no steering occur (M
= 77.38, SD = 41.68). There were no significant main effects or interactions on estimates of the
time that the perpetrator’s face was visible.
Perceived Bias. We predicted scores on the witness bias scale from the full model
ANOVA, there was only a main effect of influence, F(1, 271) = 124.53, p < .001, η2 = .32.
Participants were able to detect that steering was biased, rating steering as more biased in the
steering condition (M = 2.99, SD = 1.12) than the no steering condition (M =1.78, SD = 0.60).
Participants also guessed whether the administrator knew which photo was of the suspect. We
predicted this variable using the full model in a binary logistic regression. The only significant
predictor was again steering, B = .662, Wald χ2(1) = 5.86, p = .015, OR = 1.94, 95% CI [1.13,
3.31]. The odds ratio indicates that participants were more likely to guess that the lineup was
single blind in the steering rather than the no steering condition.
Study 2 Discussion
The primary goal of the Study 2 was to study the effect of information transfer—that is
information about which photo is the suspect—on a witnesses’ identification decision. The
strongest and consistent effect throughout the studies was the effect of steering; trained
administrators were consistently able to steer participants away from fillers and toward the
suspect or get them to reject the lineup. Steering was also able to get witnesses to switch from
their original choice to a new choice—which undercuts the reliability of eyewitness
identification. The results of switchers were stark (with almost all switches occurring in steering
conditions) and convincing (movement almost always toward the suspect or lineup rejection).
These results provide some of the best evidence for a direct information transfer from
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administrator to witness. This information is extra-legal and contaminates the process. In this
experiment the steering was strong and as a result led participants to rate the procedure as more
biased, to rate their memory as less reliable, and to correctly guess that the administrator knew
the suspect.
Although we expected an effect of steering based on past findings, replicating the
steering effect adds to our applied knowledge and gives more evidence in support the doubleblind recommendation. It was very possible, after all, that participants would simply ignore
steering and suggestion from administrators and instead stick with their initial decision. Indeed,
many individuals likely think that they would react to steering in an unbiased and independent
fashion. However, witnesses did make use of extra-legal information; participants were ready
and willing to take cues from steering administrators. The switching results, in particular,
indicate that witness gleaned information from nonblind administrators and used this information
to influence their decisions—not decision criteria. When witnesses changed their initial
identification decision, they typically switched from fillers to the suspect or a rejection,
indicating newly gleaned information from the administrators who were steering them.
Another goal of this study was to moderate the effects of administrator influence,
increasing or decreasing the size of the steering effect with distraction (i.e., cognitive load) and
motivation (i.e., a reward). We found evidence for the hypothesized effect of cognitive load. As
expected, high cognitive load effectively reduced the ability of the witnesses to pick up on cues
from an administrator about which photo to pick. The shape of the interaction was as predicted;
high cognitive load eliminated the steering effect that was present under low cognitive load. It
should be noted that the cognitive load manipulation was surprisingly effective. Participants did
not ignore the tones, accurately gauging and counting their number. However—even with strong
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steering cues—high cognitive load effectively blocked these sometimes-obvious cues to which
lineup member was the suspect.
However, the financial motivation manipulation had an opposite effect than we
hypothesized. The effect of steering was eliminated by financial motivation, not increased.
Conversely, the effect of steering was detectable when financial incentives were not offered. One
possible explanation for this pattern of effects, alluded to previously, may be that administrators
were more effective at steering toward rejections than toward identifications of the suspect. Our
original hypothesis regarding the moderating effect of financial motivation was premised on the
belief that steering would get individuals to choose the suspect. In fact, steering got individuals
to pick the suspect as well as reject the lineup. The effectiveness of rejection-steering would
change our a priori based prediction. Steering toward the suspect is consistent with our reward,
which was clearly premised on identifying the suspect. However, steering toward a rejection is
inconsistent with our financial motivation; participants would have known that by rejecting the
lineup—even though rejection was correct and they were getting steered to make that decision—
that they would not earn the extra money. One possible explanation, therefore, is that the
financial motivation worked, but the manipulation motivated participants to ignore cues to reject
(as observed) rather than use cues to identify the suspect (as hypothesized). This alternative
explanation is consistent with the data observed here and could be tested a priori by ensuring that
the operationalizations of motivation and steering are consistent—for instance motivating correct
decisions and then steering toward correct rejections—and then observing a “flip” in the
interaction in the direction we originally hypothesized. An additional way to think of this, and
future tests, is to recognize that witness can likely be motivated to both use and ignore the cues
provided by administrators.
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Thus, a key issue that remains to be tested in future research is whether different forms of
witness motivation produce different patterns of identification decisions. The precise nature the
motivation of actual witnesses is unknown and understudied. It appears, based on these results,
that it may be possible to motivate witnesses to do many different things during a lineup. The
unknowns surrounding motivation present avenues for further research on what motivations
witnesses bring to real-world lineups and how those motivations affect identification decisions.
Surprisingly, there were no significant effects of information transfer on confidence. Past
research has shown that confirming feedback does increase witness confidence (Douglass &
Steblay, 2006; Steblay et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Moreover, from a theoretical
standpoint, this paper has assumed an expectancy effect model mediated by information cues
sent by an administrator. These cues, which may be both consistent and inconsistent with the
decision of the witness, should affect confidence, and this has been observed under some
conditions (i.e, Charman & Quiroz, 2016). Yet here we did not find any empirical evidence of
confidence inflation with consistent cues or confidence deflation with inconsistent cues. One
explanation is that confidence was not the primary outcome of interest in this study. As such, it
may be that our script gave participants both consistent and inconsistent cues at times, which
would interfere with any confidence effects. The script required RAs to only give clear
confirming feedback (smiles, “good job”) when the witness selected the suspect, and this did not
happen very often, limiting the opportunity for clear confirming feedback. Additionally, the
script forced RAs to change tactics often and even switch goals—steering toward rejections—to
avoid filler identifications. The ability to change tactics—designed to increase the effect of
steering and allow adaptability—may have sent mixed signals to the witness, or even convinced
the witness that they were making progress when they were not.
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Related to the issue of confidence is the issue of meta-cognitions. As far as we know, this
is the first study to show that steering decreases witnesses’ confidence in their own memories.
Participants reported that administrators were more biased when steering than when not steering,
indicating that they noticed the administrator trying to influence them—a finding that is
consistent with past research (e.g., Alberts et al., 2008). In addition, however, steering led to
decreased scores on the metacognitive scale and increased ratings of the distance of the
perpetrator from the camera. A possible explanation is that witnesses confronted with an
administrator steering them toward a photo that did not match their memory caused the witnesses
to discount the strength of their own memory for the actual perpetrator. This explanation
indicates that witnesses do trust information coming from an administrator and that they use this
information—in this case that they are making an incorrect decision—to adjust their
metacognitions appropriately. In this way, the observed effect of steering on metacognitions is
the opposite of the confidence inflation effect due to confirming feedback (Douglass & Steblay,
2006).
There are also some important limitations to this study. Although we used stimulus
sampling for the lineups, we did not use stimulus sampling for our manipulations. Something
unknown about the tone tasks or financial motivation may be causing the specific results.
Furthermore, given time constraints and data elimination, our study was sufficiently powered but
not overly so, especially considering analyses where we added predictive factors, such as in the
confidence analyses. Most important, however, our methods lacked some features of ecological
validity. Our videos were pixilated. Our steering manipulation was obvious (although video
evidence suggests that steering in real identification procedures can be heavy handed). Our
administrators were not trained police officers. Moreover, the audio tone task and the reward
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manipulation lack realism; no witness would ever be asked to do these specific tasks, even if we
can imagine real world witnesses who are distracted or highly motivated. Although the
manipulations successfully altered psychological processes that may be important in the
identification context, the lack of ecological validity should be accompanied with caution when
attempting to generalize these findings to actual identification procedures.
The limitations were the result of a conscious effort to focus on theoretical insights and
the goal of better understanding the social interaction between administrator and witness. Despite
limitations in ecological validity, this project makes both a theoretical and applied contribution.
From a theoretical standpoint, both motivation and ability manipulations affected witnesses’
identification decisions (albeit not the hypothesized motivation effect). These findings suggest
that the Elaboration Likelihood Model can be a useful theoretical guide to understanding
information transfer between administrator and witness. Moving forward, researchers can
continue to build a social interaction model of eyewitness-administrator interaction. From an
applied standpoint, these findings—especially the findings regarding the effect of steering on
switchers—provides further evidence of the impropriety of administrator influence.

62

Chapter 4: General Discussion
In summary, the goal of this project was to examine the transfer of extra-legal
information from a nonblind administrator to a witness during a lineup administration. We
proposed a taxonomy of moderators for information transfer based on the Elaboration Likelihood
Model of persuasion, which posit that a person will process information when motivated and
able. Specifically, administrators should transmit cues and witnesses will receive cues when they
are motivated and able to do so. The aim of our first study was to analyze cue transmission by an
administrator. However, there was little to indicate that nonblind administrators were
transmitting more cues than blind administrators. A possible explanation—which can be seen in
the fact that motivation but not administrator blindness affected observer’s coding of the overall
pressure from the administrator—is that financial motivation encouraged blind administrators to
pressure witnesses to pick someone from the lineup, despite not knowing which photo was
depicted the suspect. Without differential cue transmission between single-blind and doubleblind conditions, it was impossible to test for moderators of differential cue transmission. In the
second study, we found the hypothesized interaction between cognitive load and steering. When
participants were under low cognitive load and paired with administrators who were steering
their choices, they were more likely to pick suspects and to reject the lineup subsequent steering
than when paired with administrators who did not steer them, suggesting that they were picking
up on the cues sent by the steering administrators. When under high cognitive load, participants
were unaffected by the cues sent by the administrators; they were equally likely to pick suspects
and to reject the lineup irrespective of whether the administrator sent cues. Also, in this second
study, we found an interaction between motivation and steering but not in the hypothesized
direction. Financially motivated participants were less likely to act on the administrators’ cues
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than were participants who lacked a financial motivation to pick the suspect, again due to the
possibility that participants were motivated to choose from the lineup—despite the warning that
the suspect might not be present. Overall, however, the results from the second study support the
theory that information transfer from administrators to witnesses occurs, that motivation and
ability variables can moderate this transfer, and that the motivation and ability taxonomy can aid
prediction of when information transfer might be more likely to occur.
There are also three implications when looking at the results of both studies together. The
first implication is that social interaction is a critical part of lineups, even though there may be
other ways to apply dual-process models to lineups. The second implication, resulting from the
data on motivation, indicate that the motivations of witnesses can have a meaningful effect on
behavior, should be operationalized in multiple ways, and is largely unstudied in real-world
witnesses. Finally, the results have practical implications, providing strong support for the use of
double-blind procedures and video recording of lineups. We deal with each of these four
implications in turn.
Dual-Process Models of Information Transfer in Identification Procedures
The variables manipulated in this study drew heavily on the Elaboration Likelihood
Model (ELM) for inspiration. A primary goal of this research was to test whether the ability and
motivation taxonomy provided by the ELM would also moderate the transfer of information
between nonblind administrators and witnesses. To some degree the application of dual process
models to the lineup administration context was a success; ability and motivation had a
moderating influence in Study 2, and the cognitive load effect worked as expected. Furthermore,
although almost every study of administrator influence has shown that the ability of the
administrator to send information affects lineup decisions (see Kovera & Evelo, 2017), this
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research was the first time that a study demonstrated that the ability of the witness to receive that
information affects lineup decisions as well. This effect of motivation and ability is a prediction
derived directly from ELM and indicates that further study of this model applied to lineups may
prove useful. Moreover, the moderating effect of witness ability to receive administrator cues
indicates that social factors must be accounted for in future models of witnesses’ identification
decisions made during single-blind lineup lineups.
In another sense, however, the test of the model was not successful. The effects of
financial motivation did not occur as expected. In addition, the effects of administrator cues did
not influence witness confidence in the ways that we had expected. We deal with the
implications of each of these findings on their own in the next sections. But taken together, the
results regarding motivation and confidence could indicate that the model is not correctly
specified—at least when applied to eyewitness interactions. Therefore, a question resulting from
this study is whether there are other conceptualizations or methods of applying the ELM or other
dual-process models to eyewitnesses that may better explain the data and could be tested for in
the future.
As a reminder, the ELM is a dual process model that posits that the method of processing
a persuasive argument will influence whether someone will be persuaded by that argument. The
key variables in the model were manipulated in a foundational study by Chaiken and
Maheswaren (1994). Participants read a review about a tech product (answering machine), which
served as the information to be processed. The review argued that the product was superior to
other products on the market and compared the products on a number of features. The authors
varied the strength of the persuasive argument by manipulating which features were reviewed;
the strong argument emphasized many essential features of the product, the weak argument

65

emphasized many nonessential features of the product, and the ambiguous argument emphasized
both essential and non-essential features. Message strength aimed to manipulate ability of a
message receiver to process the information; participants were expected to be able to correctly
evaluate the strong and weak information, but unable to evaluate the ambiguous information.
Chaiken and Maheswaren manipulated motivation by convincing some participants that their
opinions were important (i.e., self-relevant, one of a few data points) while convincing other
participants that their opinions were unimportant (i.e., averaged with other, not self-relevant).
Last, Chaiken and Maheswaren manipulated source credibility to be either high or low; half the
reviews came from a reputable source while the other half did not. This final manipulation
served as peripheral information.
The argument for the ELM is that participants will be persuaded by persuasive arguments
when they are able and motivated to elaborate on (i.e., systematically process) the information. If
either motivation or ability is lacking, participants will make use of the heuristics to process
peripheral information (if it is available), rating the product favorably after reading a review
from a reputable source but not after reading a review from a disreputable. This pattern of effects
is exactly what the authors found. When the task was not important, participants did not rate the
product differently based on argument strength, but instead were affected only by source
credibility—ranking the product as better when it came from a reputable source. When the
importance of the task was high, participants were able to differentiate among argument strength,
ranking the product more favorably after the strong argument than the weak argument. However,
when the argument was ambiguous—and even though task importance was high—participants
instead relied on source credibility to form object attitudes. In other words, the ambiguous
message was confusing, and because it was unable to be relied upon, participants fell back on
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peripheral information (and the heuristic that reputable sources can be trusted) to help them form
their opinion.
In applying the ELM to the administrator-eyewitness interaction model, we have argued
that aspects of this model apply to the lineup interaction. For instance, in Study 2, we postulated
that extra-legal information from the administrator was the equivalent of a message and that
witness participants would process that message only if motivated and able. To directly draw the
comparisons with the study performed by Chaiken and Maheswaren, high cognitive load would
be similar to the ambiguous message, because it was designed to interfere with ability to process.
High financial motivation would be like the high importance manipulation, creating motivation
to process. When motivational and ability were low, we hypothesized that witnesses would be
unable to use steering information from the lineup administrator to make a decision—just like
the participants in Chaiken and Maheswaren who were unable to use information in the review to
form attitudes.
Our original interpretation may still be useful for understanding identification decisions
made during single-blind lineups, especially given the support we found for the cognitive load
effects on decision making. However, there is another way to apply the ELM to lineup. In this
application, memory would serve as the persuasive message; that is to say that memory should
be processed effortfully and in a systematic way—if witnesses are motivated by accuracy. Cues
from the administrator would serve as peripheral information on which the witness relies when
superficially processing because they are unwilling or unable to use elaboration/systematic
processing. This metaphor provides new insights into the possible effects of motivation and
ability on the use of administrator cues. In this case, the model would predict that witnesses
should prefer to rely on their memory of the culprit to guide their decision (witnesses would be
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motivated by accuracy in much the same way perceivers in the ELM are motivated by accuracy,
see Petty & Wegener, 1999, p. 44). However, they will not rely on this memory if they are
unmotivated to do so. It is difficult to imagine a real world case where a witness would be
unmotivated to rely on their memory or put much effort into recalling and processing their
memory (which is where this extension of the model may not make sense) but low motivation
witnesses might exist for less severe crimes that are not self-relevant or did not victimize the
witness. Witnesses also might not rely on their memory if they were unable. Real world
equivalence is more probable in this hypothetical, where many estimator variables—like the
presence of a weapon, lighting, distance, stress—could lower memory quality to the point where
a memory is unable to be used by the witness. In these cases, the model would predict that
witnesses would be more likely to rely on cues from the administrator. There is some mixed
evidence that supports search for additional information when memory is weak from other
studies. For instance, we found that longer retention intervals increased reliance on administrator
cues (Zimmerman et al., 2017) but surprisingly shorter encoding intervals did not (Evelo et al.,
2020), possibly because the manipulation was insufficient.
A question that results from the new application of dual process models is whether cues
from the administrator could operate as peripheral information. A key defining quality of
peripheral information is that it leads to less attitude change and can be easily processed using
heuristics (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegner, 1999). The peripheral cue in this case,
would therefore have to be processed easily, with a heuristic like “trust the police”, which
encouraged people to rely on cueing information. The peripheral information would also have to
be available. The basic dual process theories do state that information must be available to be
processed (Chen & Chaiken, 1999, pp. 82-83; Petty & Wegner, 1999, pp. 48–49). The effect of
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cognitive load in Study 2 did not interrupt the heuristic processing but eliminated accessibility of
the information which the witness could have processed peripherally. In other words, participants
would need the access to information to attend to that information, regardless of the level of
processing they use. This is still consistent with the result from Study 2, which show quite
clearly that witnesses can be distracted almost completely from any information coming from the
administrator.
The take-away message is that these models may not fit the data perfectly, but some
application of information processing models may help guide our understanding of witnessadministrator interactions. It seems there are multiple sources of information for witnesses to
process, and they may process this information in different ways. The simplest application may
be best. Eyewitnesses are motivated to make an accurate decision. They will seek out
information from their memory to help them make this decision. They may also seek out
additional information from the social environment, especially if their memory is weak. Both
sources of information, memorial and social, will only be used if the information is available to
the witness and if the witness is motivated and able to use it.
Motivation
In both studies, we attempted to manipulate the motivation of legal actors. In the first
study, we attempted to motivate the transmission of cues, and in the second we tried to motivate
the receipt and use of sent cues. Both manipulations failed, possibly because the motivation
manipulations produced unintended consequences. In both cases, the reward motivation was
financial and large in comparison to the compensation for participation in the study but
contingent upon choosing behavior (as opposed to correct lineup rejections). It is possible that
participants knew that a choice had to be made to win the reward at all, in which case choosing
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was always better than rejection. We may have created a situation in which participants—like
lottery hopefuls—knew they had to play to win. The findings from the studies support this
conclusion. In the Cue Transmission Study, the most consistent effect was of motivation on the
pressure applied by the administrator—not to choose the suspect—but to choose anyone. There
is a possibility that when administrators could not get the witness to identify the suspect, they
urged the witness to pick anyone because they assumed a one out of six chance is better than
nothing. In Study 2, this motivation to pick someone rather than no one would also explain why
the financial manipulation caused participants to ignore cues from the administrator to reject the
lineup. Evidence for this possible explanation is that both studies showed very high choosing
rates (Study 1, 85%; Study 2, 77%), especially considering that the lineups were all culprit
absent. Other areas of the eyewitness literature show much smaller choosing rates in eyewitness
lineups. One meta-analysis found that the literature on lineup presentation (Steblay et al., 2001)
has closer to 51% simultaneous and 28% sequential choosing in culprit-absent scenarios. An
examination of regularities in all eyewitness identification decisions indicated that culprit absent
lineups tended to be rejected 52% of the time (Clark et al., 2008).
A related possibility is that our design failed to sufficiently motivate all administrators—
not just those in the reward condition. Although we motivated half the administrators with the
financial reward, past studies (e.g., Zimmerman et al., 2017) have motivated all administrators in
some way or another. This motivation may be required to get administrators in single-blind
lineups to send information that administrators in double-blind lineups do not.
In summary, there were unforeseen complications with our operationalization and design
choices regarding motivation. The fact that we have failed to sufficiently motivate participants or
motivated them to behave in unintended ways, however, sheds light on the fact that researchers
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have failed to study different type of motivations and know very little about the motivations of
witnesses. Most published research seems to assume that witnesses are motivated to identify the
suspect, but only few have tested whether this assumption is valid. For example, one recent study
(Eisen et al., 2017) found that participant who thought they were witnesses to a real crime were
apparently more motivated to make an identification, indicating they felt more pressure to choose
and were 2.5 times more likely to make a choice from real showups than in a lab simulation. But
as the results here show, witnesses may be motivated by things other than accuracy and desire to
catch a culprit. We found both administrators and witnesses were affected by a reward; when
offered a reward, administrators put pressure on witnesses to choose, and witnesses were more
likely to ignore cues to reject the lineup. In both cases, the reward motivated behavior that was
technically incorrect, indicating that both administrators and witness can be motivated to do
things in a lineup other than catch a culprit. Many other motivations may occur in the real world.
For instance, witnesses may be motivated to not implicate the wrong person. They may be tired
and motivated by a desire to leave the police station, to not get involved, to avoid going to trial,
or to avoid reprisals from a criminal or his accomplices. Additionally, the findings from this
study show that different motivations may have counterintuitive effects on how a witness
interprets cues from a lineup administrator. Researchers should explore what motivations
witnesses bring with them to a lineup and not assume their only motivation is to identify the
suspect.
Practical Implications
Although these studies have focused on the modeling the theoretical interaction between
eyewitness and administrator, there are also lessons from these results that apply to actual
lineups. The first and most obvious implication is that lineups should be conducted in a double-
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blind manner. Although we did not find an effect of administrator knowledge in Study 1, we did
find a clear and convincing effect of administrator behavior (steering) in Study 2. Study 2
administrators were able to influence the choices of their witnesses except when cognitive load
interfered with this influence. This study also shows that the information able to be passed from
administrator to witness is extra-legal, that is, not from memory. Moreover, and most drastically,
Study 2 administrators were able to get a large number of witnesses to actually go against initial
choices and end up choosing the suspect or rejecting the lineup. Overall, these results support the
idea that administrators can influence witnesses and adds to the literature on administrator
influence (Kovera & Evelo, 2017).
The second practical implication is that lineups must be video recorded. In fact, video
recording of lineups is now an official recommendation of the American-Psychology Law
Society (Wells et al., 2020), and the evidence here supports that recommendation. Blind coders,
using nothing but video tapes, were able to detect motivated administrators in Study 1, somewhat
able to detect administrator knowledge in Study 1, and steering in Study 2. These results support
the idea that video tapes can be important tools to detect improper influence by legal decision
makers. The results from the video tapes also showed that motivated administrators (Study 1)
and steering administrators (Study 2) tended to produce longer lineups. The video tapes were
especially crucial to Study 2 in showing that some witness had changed their initial decision to
conform to the desire of the administrator. Without videotapes, this evidence would have been
lost. Video tapes are the only way to preserve an accurate record of the entire lineup proceedings
and to viably check for impropriety after the fact.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, these studies provide useful data for eyewitness theory and applied lineup
issues. These data support continued use of an of the administrator-eyewitness interaction model,
although key aspects of the model—such as what counts as peripheral cueing—will need
clarification. Ability and motivation variables moderated information transfer in Study 2. Both
studies showed the need for continued study of motivation, confidence, and issues surrounding
confidence-accuracy calibration. Most important, these findings are consistent with the continued
recommendation of double-blind procedures and video recording in actual lineups (Wells et al.,
2020). Memory is fragile, and it is readily contaminated by extra-legal information.
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Table 1
Demographic Data for Both Administrators and Witnesses
Administrators
n
%

Witnesses
n
%

Total
n

%

Gender
Female
Male
Other
Total

183
129
1
313

59
41
-100

194
120
3
317

61
38
1
100

377
249
4
630

60
40
1
100

Race/Ethnicity
Asian
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latinx
White/European American
Other/Mixed
Total

31
101
90
67
25
314

10
32
29
21
8
100

34
107
74
75
27
317

11
34
23
24
9
100

65
208
164
142
52
631

10
33
26
23
8
100

Education
Less than High School
High School or Equivalent
College Graduate
Post Graduate Degree
Total

5
178
106
22
311

2
57
34
7
100

1
202
91
22
316

-64
29
7
100

6
380
197
44
627

1
60
31
7
1

Note. Data is deleted pairwise. Percent values are for valid cases only. Dash marks indicate that
the percent is less than 1.
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Table 2
A Priori Lineup Mock Witness and Fairness Results
Tredoux E
Functional
Effective
Size
Size
N
Hits (%)
E
95 % CI
Lineup 1
65
8 (12)
8.13
4.38
4.18
[3.41, 5.40]
Lineup 2
66
9 (14)
7.33
3.91
3.51
[2.81, 4.69]
Lineup 3
67
7 (10)
9.57
5.24
5.52
[4.87, 6.38]
Note. See Malpass et al. (2007) for a summary of equations; E = Tredoux’s E.
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Table 3
A Posteriori Lineup Fairness Results

Study 1
Lineup 1
Lineup 2
Lineup 3

N

Hits (%)

Resultant
Functional
Size

29
29
29

11 (38)
4 (14)
4 (14)

2.64
7.25
7.25

Resultant
Effective
Size
3.36
3.62
3.62

Resultant Tredoux E
E

95 % CI

3.64
4.5
4.27

[2.79, 5.22]
[3.36, 6.81]
[3.11, 6.82]

Study 2
Lineup 1
40
26 (65)
1.54
2.64
2.18
[1.61, 3.38]
Lineup 2
35
20 (29)
3.5
3.21
3.45
[2.60, 5.12]
Lineup 3
40
6 (15)
6.67
3.75
2.77
[2.18, 3.81]
Note. See Quigley-McBride and Wells (2020) for assessing resultant lineup size and Malpass et
al. (2007) for a summary of equations; E = Tredoux’s E.
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Table 4
Number of Administrators Engaging in Biasing Behaviors by Knowledge Conditions
D-B

S-B

Administrator Behavior
1. Said he/she was a detective/cop/law
enforcement(etc.)
2. Told the witness to take their time

n
8

%
8

n
8

%
7

χ2
0.09

p
.770

θ
−.02

31

29

43

35

0.93

.334

.06

3. Told the witness to look carefully

10

9

16

13

0.76

.383

.06

4. Asked/prompted the witness to describe the
features of the perpetrator
5. Asked/prompted witness to compare
photographs
7. Pointed or tapped at a photo/s

36

34

33

27

1.28

.257

−.08

12

11

18

15

0.59

.444

.05

30

28

42

34

0.99

.321

.07

8. Asked about a specific photo/s

28

26

31

25

0.03

.863

−.01

9. Said "it seems like you're looking a long
time at this photo"
10. Asked the witness to think about a
photograph from another angle or profile
13. Asked "are you sure" after an ID was
made
14. Removed photos/allowed photos to be
removed
15. Returned photos/allowed photos to be
returned
16. Had the witness to take another look after
initially rejecting the lineup
17. Had the witness to take another look after
making an initial ID
18. Repeated witness’s choice in questioning
manner
19. Paused before recording the ID and
uttered "okay" or similar hedge
20. Told the witness he/she knows which
photo is of the suspect
21. Told the witness he/she does not know
which photo is of the suspect
22. Told the witness that this is for a real case

4

4

13

11

3.89

.048

.13

21

20

24

20

0.00

.979

−.00

27

26

33

27

0.07

.787

.02

27

26

32

26

0.02

.896

.01

8

8

12

10

0.37

.542

.04

12

11

15

12

0.05

.820

.02

14

13

23

19

1.33

.249

.08

30

28

34

28

0.01

.942

−.01

32

30

45

37

1.14

.286

.07

3

3

8

7

1.72

.190

.09

7

7

1

1

5.61

.018

−.16

6

6

9

7

0.27

.602

.04

1

1

1

1

0.01

.920

−.01

23. Mentioned financial bonus of some sort
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Note. Number represent item on the coding sheets in Appendix N. Items 6, 11, and 12 are
omitted due to poor reliability. Percent values are valid within administrator knowledge
conditions; D-B = Double-blind; S-B = Single-blind.

78

Table 5
Number of Administrators Engaging in Suspect Specific Behaviors by Knowledge Conditions
Photo Type
χ2

p

V

4.18

.124

.24

1.87

.394

.18

9. Said "it seems like you're looking a long time at this photo"
Blind
1 (25)
1 (25)
2 (50)
Nonblind
3 (25)
4 (33)
5 (42)

0.11

.994

.09

10. Asked to think about a photograph from another angle
Blind
10 (53)
6 (32)
3 (16)
Nonblind
8 (44)
7 (39)
3 (17)

0.27

.873

.09

13. Asked "are you sure" after an ID was made
Blind
19 (79)
0 (0)
Nonblind
21 (75)
0 (0)

0.13

.722

.05

1.06

.303

.14

Behavior

Fillers (%)

Mixed (%)

Suspect (%)

6 (20)
17 (41)

5 (17)
8 (19)

4 (15)
9 (29)

5 (19)
6 (19)

7. Pointed or tapped at a photo/s

Blind
Nonblind

19 (63)
17 (41)

8. Asked about a specific photo/s

Blind
Nonblind

18 (67)
16 (52)

14. Removed photos/allowed photos to be removed
Blind
7 (27)
19 (73)
Nonblind
12 (40)
18 (60)

5 (21)
7 (25)
0 (0)
0 (0)

15. Returned photos/allowed photos to be returned
1.54
.464 .30
Blind
3 (43)
4 (57)
0 (0)
Nonblind
2 (20)
7 (70)
1 (10)
Note. Items 6, 11, and 12 are omitted due to poor reliability. Item counts do not match item
counts in Table 4 because in some videos, coders could not tell which photos administrators
targeted.
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Table 6
All Witness Choices in All Conditions: Cue Transmission
D-B
Motivation Conditions
No Confession
No Reward

$25 Reward

Confession
No Reward

Decision

n

S-B

Total

%

n

%

n

%

Suspect
Filler
Reject
Total

2
26
6
34

6
76
18
100

6
25
4
35

17
71
11
100

8
51
10
69

17
71
11
100

Suspect
Filler
Reject
Total

5
18
4
27

19
67
15
100

8
14
4
26

31
54
15
100

13
32
8
53

25
60
15
100

Suspect
Filler

6
16

20
53

7
27

18
71

13
43

19
63

Reject
Total

8
30

27
100

4
38

11
100

12
68

18
100

$25 Reward

Suspect
6
25
7
19
13
21
Filler
15
63
26
70
41
67
Reject
3
13
4
11
7
11
Total
24
100
37
100
61
100
Note. Percent values are valid within administrator knowledge conditions; D-B = Double-blind;
S-B = Single-blind.
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Table 7
All Witness Choices in All Conditions: Cue Reception Study 2

Conditions
Low Cognitive Load
No Reward

Decision

No Steering
n
%

Steering
n
%

Total
n

%

Suspect
Filler
Reject
Total

10
19
6
35

29
54
17
100

11
10
14
35

31
29
40
100

21
29
20
70

30
41
29
100

Suspect
Filler
Reject
Total

10
17
8
35

29
49
23
100

11
12
12
35

31
34
34
100

21
29
20
70

30
41
29
100

Suspect
Filler

9
20

26
57

16
14

46
40

25
34

36
49

Reject
Total

6
35

17
100

5
35

14
100

11
70

16
100

Suspect
13
38
14
40
Filler
17
50
13
37
Reject
4
12
8
23
Total
34
100
35
100
Note. Percent values are valid within administrator knowledge conditions.

27
30
12
69

39
43
17
100

$25 Reward

High Cognitive Load
No Reward

$25 Reward
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Table 8
Model Fit Statistics for Predicting Binary Witness Decisions
χ2

df

p

−2 LL

R2

Suspect
Step 1
3.30
3
.347
353.24
.01
Step 2
1.19
3
.755
352.05
.02
Step 3
0.63
1
.427
351.42
.02
Filler
Step 1
9.57
3
.023
372.81
.03
Step 2
0.83
3
.842
371.98
.04
Step 3
0.11
1
.740
371.87
.04
Reject
Step 1
10.50
3
.015
287.56
.04
Step 2
0.93
3
.819
286.63
.04
Step 3
1.78
1
.182
284.85
.05
2
Note. R in this table is calculated suing the Cox and Snell equations; LL = log likelihood.
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Table 9
The Effect of Steering on All Lineup Decisions
Conditions
No Steering
Observed
Expected
Percent
Residual

Suspect
42
46.8
30
−0.7

Steering
Observed
52
Percent
47.2
Expected
37
Residual
0.7
Note. Residual values are standardized.

Filler

Reject

Total

73
60.8
53
1.6

24
31.4
17
−1.3

139
139.0
100

49
61.2
35
−1.6

39
31.6
28
1.3

140
140.0
100
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Table 10
The Effect of Steering at Each Level of Cognitive Load
Conditions
Low Cognitive Load
No Steering
Observed
Expected
Percent
Residual

Suspect

Filler

Reject

Total

20
21.0
29
−0.2

36
29.0
51
1.3

14
20.0
20
−1.3

70
70.0
100

Steering
Observed
Percent
Expected
Residual

22
21.0
31
0.2

22
29.0
31
−1.3

26
20.0
37
1.3

70
70.0
100

High Cognitive Load
No Steering
Observed
Expected
Percent
Residual

22
25.8
32
−0.8

37
31.8
54
0.9

10
11.4
15
−0.4

69
69.0
100

Steering
30
Observed
26.2
Percent
43
Expected
0.7
Residual
Note. Residual values are standardized.

27
32.2
39
−0.9

13
11.6
19
0.4

70
70.0
100
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Table 11
The Effect of Steering at Each Level of Pay Motivation
Conditions
No Reward
No Steering
Observed
Expected
Percent
Residual

Suspect

Filler

Reject

Total

19
23.0
27
−0.8

39
31.5
56
1.3

12
15.5
17
−0.9

70
70.0
100

Steering
Observed
Percent
Expected
Residual

27
23.0
38
0.8

24
31.5
34
−1.3

19
15.5
27
0.9

70
70.0
100

$25 Reward
No Steering
Observed
Expected
Percent
Residual

23
23.8
33
−0.2

34
29.3
49
0.9

12
15.9
17
−1.0

69
69.0
100

Steering
25
Observed
24.2
Percent
36
Expected
0.2
Residual
Note. Residual values are standardized.

25
29.7
36
−0.9

20
16.1
29
1.0

70
70.0
100

85

Table 12
Participants who Changed Confidence
Confidence
Participant
57

Lineup Choice

Original
25

Final
60

Original
Filler

Final
Suspect

68

100

90

N/A

Filler

134

80

70

N/A

Suspect

139

85

70

Filler

Suspect

199

75

50

N/A

Suspect

254

90

70

Filler

Reject

Note. Participant numbers are used to identify data and are arbitrary. Individuals who did not
change lineup decisions have N/A as their original choice; N/A = Not applicable.
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Figure 1
The Generic Expectancy Effect Mediation Model
Expecter’s
Expectations

Expecter's
Behavior

Target’s Behavior
or Outcome

Note. This model is adapted from the multiple sources (Jussim, 1986; Rosenthal, 2002; Trusz &
Bąbel, 2016). Each box represents potential measured variables. The first box represents
predictor or independent variables. The second box represents mediators. The third box
represents potential outcome or dependent variables. Each arrow represents the effect of one
variable on another. The model is theoretical; error is not represented. Adapted from “Covert
Communication in Classrooms, Clinics, Courtrooms, and Cubicles,” by R. Rosenthal, 2002,
American Psychologist, 57, p. 845. Copyright [2002] by the American Psychological
Association.
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Figure 2
The Administrator-Eyewitness Interaction Model
Administrator’s
Expectations

Administrator’s
Behavior

Administrator’s
Characteristics:
Motivation and Ability

Witness’s
Decision

Witness’s
Characteristics:
Motivation and Ability

Note. The model is based on the generic expectancy effect mediation (see Figure 1) but applies
the crucial eyewitness variables for the independent, mediating, and dependent variables.
Furthermore, the model includes a hypothesized framework of moderators which may change
each effect. The administrator’s characteristics (motivation and ability to send cues) moderate
the effect of the administrator’s expectations on the administrator’s behavior. The witness’s
characteristics (motivation and ability to use cues) moderate the effect of the administrator’s
behavior on the witness’s decision.
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Figure 3
Lineups Used in the Cue Transmission Study (Study 1)

Figure 3. Panel 1, 2, 3, contain Lineups 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Panel 4 are the perpetrators, in
lineup order. The innocent suspects for Lineups 1, 2 and 3 are in positions 4, 3, and 5,
respectively. Photos go from Position 1 (left) to Position 6 (Right). The photos were printed in
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color on separate 4” × 6” glossy photo paper, labeled as Photo #1-6 on the back. Participants
were instructed to display the photos in a 2 × 3 grid.
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Figure 4
Count of Times Each Photo Was Selected by Switchers
30

Original Choice
Final Choice

25

20

15

10

5

0
Photo #1

Photo #2

Photo #3

Photo #4

Photo #5

Photo #6

Reject

Note. This figure indicates the choices of switchers (n = 46, participants who changed their
choice). Gray bars represent the number of switchers that selected each photo as their original
choice. The black bars represent the number of switchers that selected each photo as their final
choice. There bars only represent 44 choices because 2 original choices were unclear on the
video.
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Appendix A: Craigslist Example Flyer in Studies 1 and 2
Study 1
Recruiting people to participate in a study of how people make legal decisions. The study will take place
at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice (on 11th Avenue). During the study, you will watch a video,
complete a task with another participant, and give your impressions on the task.

You will be PAID $20 in cash for 45 minutes of your time.
You must be fluent in English and be at least 18 years old to participate. If you would like to
participate, please contact the researcher at koveralab.HOR@jjay.cuny.edu
Study 2
Recruiting people to participate in a study of how people make legal decisions. The study will
take place at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice (on 11th Avenue). During the study, you
will watch a video, participate in a task, and give you impressions on the task.
You will be PAID $20 in cash for 45 minutes of your time.
You must be fluent in English and be at least 18 years old to participate. If you would like to
participate, please contact the researcher at koveralab.HOR@jjay.cuny.edu
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Appendix B: Lineup Filler Tasks in Study 1 & 2

Dinosaur Word Search Puzzles

Can you find these dinosaur names in the grid?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

ALLOSAURUS
PROTOCERATOPS
CERATOSAURUS
COELOPHYSIS
DIPLODOCUS
STYRACOSAURUS
KENTROSAURUS
TRACHODON
VELOCIRAPTOR

MONOCLONIUS
APATOSAURUS
SPINOSAURUS
ANKYLOSAURUS
STEGOSAURUS
IGUANODON
GALLIMIMUS
TRICERATOPS
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Animal Word Search Puzzle
Find and circle all of the words that are hidden in the grid.
The words may be hidden in any direction.

ANTELOPE
BEAR
CAT
DOG
ELEPHANT
FROG
GIRAFFE
HORSE
IGUANA
JAGUAR
KOALA
LEOPARD
MOUSE

NEWT
OWL
PARROT
QUOLL
RAT
SNAKE
TIGER
URCHIN
VOLE
WARTHOG
XANTU
YAK
ZEBRA
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Appendix C: Administrator Questionnaire in Study 1
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements by checking a
box on the scale below:
1. The witness’s lineup decision would provide useful information for police if this were a reallife criminal investigation.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
2. I pressured the witness to identify someone in this lineup.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Agree

☐
Strongly
agree

3. I tried to get the witness to pick a particular person in the lineup.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

4. I was fair and impartial throughout the lineup administration.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

☐
Agree

5. I believe that my behavior influenced the decision made by the witness in this lineup.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
6. All things considered, the lineup administration was fair and unbiased.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

Instructions: Please tell us a little bit about the lineup you just conducted.
1.

Do you remember what the suspect in this case was charged with? (check one)
☐ Robbery
☐ Burglary
☐ Assault
☐ All of the above
☐ I don’t remember

2.

Do you remember anything about a confession in the case? (check one)
☐ Yes, I was told the suspect confessed
☐ No, I was not told anything about a confession
☐ I don’t remember either way

3.

Were you told the importance of getting the witness to obtain an identification of the
suspect? (check one)
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ I don’t remember

4.

Were you offered any financial compensation if the witness identified the suspect (other
than $20 for participating)? (check one)
☐ Yes, $___________ (specify amount)
☐ No
☐ I don’t remember

5.

On the following scale, how motivated were you to get the witness to identify the
suspect?
☐
Not at all
motivated

☐
Slightly
motivated

☐
Somewhat
motivated

☐
Highly
motivated

☐
Extremely
motivated

Instructions: Finally, please tell us a little about yourself.
1.

What is your age?

_________________

2.

What Gender do you identify with?
☐ Male
☐ Female
☐ Other
__________________________________

3.

With which race or ethnicity do you most closely identify with?
☐ American Indian or Alaskan Native
☐ Asian
☐ Black or African American
☐ Hispanic, Latino, or Latina
☐ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
☐ White or European American
☐ Other
__________________________________

4.

What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
☐ Less than high school
☐ High School degree or equivalent
☐ College graduate
☐ Post graduate degree

Appendix D: Witness Questionnaire in Study 1
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements by checking a
box on the scale below:
1. During the video, I had a good view of the perpetrator.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Agree

☐
Strongly
agree

2. During the video, I had a good opportunity to view the perpetrator’s face.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

3. I paid attention to the perpetrator during the videotaped crime.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

4. I felt that it was easy to make a lineup decision.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree
5. I made a lineup decision quickly.
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree

☐
Somewhat
agree

6. I would be willing to testify about my lineup decision at trial.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree
7. I have a good memory for strangers’ faces.
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree

☐
Somewhat
agree

8. I can clearly see the image of the perpetrator in my mind.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Strongly
agree
☐
Strongly
agree
☐
Strongly
agree
☐
Strongly
agree
☐
Strongly
agree

9. I would trust an eyewitness who had a similar viewing experience to mine.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

10. My lineup decision would provide useful information for the police if this were a real-life
criminal investigation.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
11. The administrator pressured me to identify someone in this lineup.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

12. The lineup administrator was trying to get me to pick a particular person in the lineup.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
13. The administrator of this lineup was fair and impartial throughout the lineup administration.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
14. The administrator’s behavior while conducting the lineup influenced my identification
decision.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
15. All things considered, the lineup administration was fair and unbiased.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

And some additional questions:
1. During the video, how far away was the perpetrator from the camera.
_______ feet _______ inches
2. During the video, how long was the perpetrator’s face in your view?
_______ seconds
3. Do you think the administrator knew who the suspect is?
☐ Yes
☐ No

Instructions: Finally, please tell us a little about yourself.
1.

What is your age?

_________________

2.

What Gender do you identify with?
☐ Male
☐ Female
☐ Other
__________________________________

3.

With which race or ethnicity do you most closely identify with?
☐ American Indian or Alaskan Native
☐ Asian
☐ Black or African American
☐ Hispanic, Latino, or Latina
☐ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
☐ White or European American
☐ Other
__________________________________

4.

What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
☐ Less than high school
☐ High School degree or equivalent
☐ College graduate
☐ Post graduate degree

Appendix E: Research Assistant Script in Study 1
<<Bring both individuals into small lab after verifying ID>>
<<Go over informed consent>>
Thank you both for agreeing to participate. As we talked about in the informed consent, you both
will be watching videos and participating in a task together. However, you will each play a
different role in that task. To decide who is doing what, please pick a number from this hat.
<<Leave P1-Witness, take P2-Admin out to waiting area>>
<<Tell P2-Admin they can do puzzles>>
<<Go back into small lab>>
Thanks for waiting. I’m going to play a short video for you now. Please pay attention. You will
be asked some questions about it afterwards.
<<Play video; sit inside room; do nothing>>
What you just witnessed was a crime recorded on a security camera. We are interested in your
memory for the culprit. In a few minutes you will participate in a photographic lineup conducted
by the other participant; in the lineup you will be asked to try and identify the culprit. I’m going
to take you out to the waiting area now. Do you have any questions before we leave?
<<Answer any questions>>
Okay, please do not discuss what was on the video with the other participant.
<<Take P1-Witness out; and tell them to do puzzles, check watch>> Time: ______________
<<Take P2-Admin into room>>
The Manhattan district attorney has hired us to consult on a criminal case. The procedure you are
participating in today will help us form a scientifically based expert opinion that we will testify
to in court.
The other participant just saw security camera footage of an individual committing the crime in
question. We would like you to play the part of a law enforcement officer conducting an
investigation into the matter. Specifically we want you to conduct a photographic lineup where
you will see if the other participant can identify the culprit from the video in a set of six
photographs.
Importantly, you need to know that there is a real suspect in custody. The suspect is currently
charged with robbery, burglary, and assault. The results of your lineup will aid us in forming our
sworn testimony about whether the recording implicates the suspect.
Begin manipulation 1(AB) alternative
A. <<Nothing>>
B. You should also know that the suspect confessed to these crimes.

END
It is important for the real case that you try to obtain an identification of the suspect.
I’m going to show you a short video on how to conduct a photographic lineup and then give you
more instructions. Do you have any questions?
<<Answer questions; start video>>
Okay, here are the materials for your lineup (envelope, identification form). This envelope
contains six photos.
<<Take out and show>>
They are numbered so you can record the choice of the other participant.
Begin manipulation 3(EF)
Begin E: There is a suspect but I cannot tell you who it is.
Begin F: The suspect is number _________, which is this one.
End
Your goal is to get the witness to identify the suspect. You may conduct the lineup in any way
you see fit. You may do or ask anything you want even if it was not depicted in the training
video. E: <<nothing>> F: However, you may not blatantly tell the witness which photo is the
suspect.
Begin manipulation 2(CD)
Begin C: <<nothing>>
Begin D: Now, if the other participant identifies the suspect, we will give you a reward of 25
dollars. This is on top of your guaranteed payment of 20 dollars that you will get regardless. Do
you understand? <<Make sure they understand>>
End
When the witness makes a choice, you can record it here <<show form>>. There is space to
check the box next to each photo number and also a box to check if the witness can’t or won’t
make an identification. You must also obtain their confidence in their choice by asking two
questions. The first asks them to describe (his or her) confidence in her own words, the second
asks her to describe her confidence on a scale from 0, not at all confident, to 100, completely
confident. For both questions, there are separate lines where you can record the answers.
When you are done, step outside where I am sitting and let me know that you are finished.
Do you have any-more questions before we begin?
<<Answer questions; go get P1-Witness>>
<<Make sure it has been at least 5 min; then being instructions>> Time begin: _________

Okay, we are ready to begin the lineup. Before I take you in I need to read you some instructions.
The other participant, playing the role of the law enforcement, is about to conduct a lineup for
you.
Begin manipulation 3 (EF)
E: We have a suspect but the administrator does not know which photo depicts the suspect.
F: The administrator has a suspect in the crime you witnessed and would like to see if you can
identify him from the lineup.
End.
Remember that the culprit’s appearance may have changed and that he may not appear as he did
in the video. Also know that the actual culprit from the video may or may not be present in the
lineup you are about to see. Are you ready?
<<Take them in and then sit outside, behind closed door>>
<<Wait for lineup to take place>>
<<When lineup is done, make sure form is filled out, take identification form>>
<<Take P2-admin to desk>>
<<Handout post questionnaires>>
<<When done PI will debrief and pay>>

Appendix F: Informed Consent Document Study 1
Title of Research Study:

Legal Decision Making

Principal Investigator:

Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D.
Professor of Psychology, Presidential Scholar

Co-Principal Investigator:

Andrew J. Evelo, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate

Research Sponsor:

Funded by a 2017 Graduate Center Dissertation
Fellowship and the National Science Foundation

You are being asked to participate in a research study because 18 years of age or older and
a resident of the United States. The purpose of this research study is to examine decision
making in a common legal setting. If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we
will ask you to watch a video. Afterwards, you will participate in a short task with another
participant and then answer some questions. For scientific reasons, this consent form does
not include complete information about the purpose of this research. You will be fully
debriefed following your participation in the research. We anticipate it will take
approximately 45 minutes.
The potential risks associated with this study are minimal. You will receive no direct benefits
from your participation. For your time, you will be compensated $20 cash at the end of the
study. If you are a CUNY student volunteering through SONA, you will also receive 2 Research
Experience Program (REP) points, which can also be obtained through other studies or class
research alternatives.
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected
during this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only
with your permission or as required by law. We will protect your confidentiality by replacing
your direct identifying information (e.g., names, contact info) with codes. Only the principle
investigators will be able to pair your data with your name. This data will be stored for future
research. Publications, presentations, and data repositories that result from this study will
not contain this identifying information.
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. You can decide to withdraw
your consent and stop participating in the research at any time, without any penalty. If you
are a CUNY student, your willingness to participate in this research study, or your request to
withdraw from the research study, will not affect your grades or academic standing.

If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of
the following researchers:
Andrew J. Evelo, M.A. (Co-Principal Investigator)
Doctoral Candidate
aevelo@gradcenter.cuny.edu
Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D. (Principal Investigator and Faculty Advisor)
Professor of Psychology, Presidential Scholar
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call
the CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email at HRPP@cuny.edu.
Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
Signature of Participant
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be
given a copy of this consent form to keep.
_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant

_____________________________________________________
Signature of Participant

__________________________
Date

Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent
_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent

_____________________________________________________
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent

__________________________
Date

Appendix G: Video Informed Consent Document in Study 1
I understand that the lineup procedure I participated in was videotaped. The experimenter has
explained to me why it was necessary to videotape the session. I have been given an opportunity
to view my tape, decline the use of my tape, and erase my tape before anyone else has the
opportunity to view it.
The experimenter has gone over my three options for the use of my videotaped data. These
include:
_____ I give permission for my videotape to be used for public demonstrations of the
phenomena studied in the experiment in which I am participating. This means that the
video may be shown to professional groups as a demonstration or be analyzed or used as
stimulus material for future studies. While names and identifying data will not be
mentioned, it is possible that you could be recognized in the videos. I also allow my
videotape to be analyzed by the researchers.
_____ I give permission for the researchers of this study to use my videotape for data analysis,
for research assistants to view and code the videotape, and for further research purposes.
However, I do NOT give permission for my videotaped data to be used in PUBLIC
demonstrations.
_____ I do not give permission for my video tape to be used and would like my videotape
destroyed.
I have read the above statement and give my permission for the researchers to use my videotape
data for the purposes I have indicated above.

__________________________________
Print Name

__________________________________
Signature

___________________
Date

Appendix H: Video Coding Forms in Study 1
1. Time of lineup:
Minutes

Seconds

Lineup start:

When did envelope open?

Lineup end:

When is the last time that the witness orally
expresses or confirms their final ID decision?

2. Overall pressure to choose (anyone): (circle one)
1
Very Low

2
Low

3
Medium

4
High

3. Pressure to pick a particular photo: (circle one for each photo)
Exerted strong Exerted some
Did not exert
Exerted some
pressure on
pressure on
any pressure at
pressure on
witness not to
witness not to
all (in either
witness to
choose photo
choose photo
direction)
choose photo

5
Very High

Exerted strong
pressure on
witness to
choose photo

#1

-2

-1

0

1

2

#2

-2

-1

0

1

2

#3

-2

-1

0

1

2

#4

-2

-1

0

1

2

#5

-2

-1

0

1

2

#6

-2

-1

0

1

2

4. Which photo do you think is the suspect? (Make a mark next to your best guess if possible)
☐
Photo #1
☐
Photo #2
☐
Photo #3
☐
Photo #4
☐
Photo #5
☐
Photo #6
☐
Cannot tell

Administrator Behavior
1:☐ Said he/she was a detective/cop/law enforcement(etc.)
2:☐ Told the witness to take their time
3:☐ Told the witness to look carefully
4:☐ Asked/prompted the witness to describe the features of the perpetrator
5:☐ Asked/prompted witness to compare photographs
6:☐ Added emphasis while administering/displaying a photograph/s
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

??☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

??☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

??☐

7:☐ Pointed or tapped at a photo/s
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

8:☐ Asked about a specific photo/s
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

9:☐ Said "it seems like you're looking a long time at this photo"
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

??☐

10:☐ Asked the witness to think about a photograph from another angle or profile
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

??☐

11:☐ Showed pleasure when the witness made an ID (e.g., smile, nod, +vocal)
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

??☐

12:☐ Showed displeasure when the witness made an ID (e.g., frown, head-shake, -vocal)
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

??☐

#6☐

??☐

13:☐ Asked "are you sure" after an ID was made
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

14:☐ Removed photos/allowed photos to be removed
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

??☐

#6☐

??☐

15:☐ Returned photos/allowed photos to be returned
Photos: #1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

16:☐ Had the witness to take another look after initially rejecting the lineup
17:☐ Had the witness to take another look after making an initial ID
18:☐ Repeated witness’s choice in questioning manner
19:☐ Paused before recording the ID and uttered "okay" or similar hedge
20:☐ Told the witness he/she knows which photo is of the suspect
21:☐ Told the witness he/she does not know which photo is of the suspect
22:☐ Told the witness that this is for a real case
23:☐ Mentioned financial bonus of some sort
24:☐ Mentioned that the suspect confessed
Witness Behavior
1:☐ The witness changed his/her lineup choice after an initial identification
Original choice: #1☐ #2☐ #3☐ #4☐ #5☐ #6☐ Reject☐
Final choice:
#1☐ #2☐ #3☐ #4☐ #5☐ #6☐ Reject☐
2:☐ The witness changed his/her confidence
If you were the administrator in this case, how would you record the choice of the witness?
1. Choice: #1☐ #2☐ #3☐ #4☐ #5☐ #6☐ Reject☐ ??☐
2. Numeric confidence: ______________________

??☐
??☐

Appendix I: Witness Questionnaire in Study 2
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements by checking a
box on the scale below:
1. During the video, I had a good view of the perpetrator.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Agree

☐
Strongly
agree

2. During the video, I had a good opportunity to view the perpetrator’s face.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

3. I paid attention to the perpetrator during the videotaped crime.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

4. I felt that it was easy to make a lineup decision.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree
5. I made a lineup decision quickly.
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree

☐
Somewhat
agree

6. I would be willing to testify about my lineup decision at trial.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree
7. I have a good memory for strangers’ faces.
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree

☐
Somewhat
agree

8. I can clearly see the image of the perpetrator in my mind.
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Agree

☐
Strongly
agree
☐
Strongly
agree
☐
Strongly
agree
☐
Strongly
agree
☐
Strongly
agree

9. I would trust an eyewitness who had a similar viewing experience to mine.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

10. My lineup decision would provide useful information for the police if this were a real-life
criminal investigation.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
11. The administrator pressured me to identify someone in this lineup.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

12. The lineup administrator was trying to get me to pick a particular person in the lineup.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
13. The administrator of this lineup was fair and impartial throughout the lineup administration.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
14. The administrator’s behavior while conducting the lineup influenced my identification
decision.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
15. All things considered, the lineup administration was fair and unbiased.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
Agree
disagree
disagree
agree

☐
Strongly
agree

And some additional questions:
3. During the video, how far away was the perpetrator from the camera.
_______ feet _______ inches
4. During the video, how long was the perpetrator’s face in your view?
_______ seconds
5. Do you think the administrator knew who the suspect is? (check one)
☐ Yes
☐ No
6. Were you told the importance of identifying the suspect? (check one)
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ I don’t remember
7. Were you offered any financial compensation for identifying the suspect (other than $20 for
participating)? (check one)
☐ Yes, $___________ (specify amount)
☐ No
☐ I don’t remember
8. On the following scale, how difficult was it to complete the lineup task while listening to the
tones?
☐
Not at all
difficult

☐
Slightly
difficult

☐
Somewhat
difficult

☐
Highly
difficult

☐
Extremely
difficult

9. On the following scale, how motivated were you to identify the suspect?
☐
Not at all
motivated

☐
Slightly
motivated

☐
Somewhat
motivated

☐
Highly
motivated

☐
Extremely
motivated

Instructions: Finally, please tell us a little about yourself.
1.

What is your age?

_________________

2.

What Gender do you identify with?
☐ Male
☐ Female
☐ Other
__________________________________

3.

With which race or ethnicity do you most closely identify with?
☐ American Indian or Alaskan Native
☐ Asian
☐ Black or African American
☐ Hispanic, Latino, or Latina
☐ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
☐ White or European American
☐ Other
__________________________________

4.

What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
☐ Less than high school
☐ High School degree or equivalent
☐ College graduate
☐ Post graduate degree

Appendix J: Research Assistant Script in Study 2
<<Go over informed consent>>
Thank you for agreeing to participate. As we talked about in the informed consent, you will be
watching a video and participating in some psychological tasks.
First, I’m going to play a short video for you now. Please pay attention. You will be asked some
questions about it afterwards.
<<Play Video>> <<Sit Down>>
<<Stand>> What you just witnessed was a crime recorded on a security camera. We are
interested in your memory for the culprit. In a few minutes you will participate in a photographic
lineup conducted by an administrator from our lab; in the lineup you will be asked to try and
identify the culprit.
In addition to the lineup, we have three memory and attention tasks we would like you to
perform. These measures will give us a better understanding of your underlying abilities.
The first is a word search puzzle. Here is the packet << take out word search >>, please leave it
face down until I tell you to begin. There are two word search puzzles in the packet with a total
of 43 words. We are interested in your attention to the puzzle and in how many words you are
able to find. They may be hidden in any direction: up, down, diagonal, backwards, or forwards.
You have 5 minutes to find as many words as you can. We do not expect that you will find them
all—and that is perfectly fine. If you do find them all, you may spend the extra time checking
your answers. I will time you on this timer.
Do you have any questions before we begin? <<Answer any questions>>
Okay are you ready? You may turn over your word search now.
<<Start timer, sit against wall>> <<if they ask questions redirect>>
Time. Please put your pen down.
Very good, I will collect that.
<<Sit at table>> It is now time for the lineup and the second attention task.
After I explain the tasks, I will go get another researcher who will conduct the lineup. The lineup
administrator has a suspect in the crime you witnessed and would like to see if you can identify
him from the lineup.
Begin Manipulation 2 (CD):
C: <<nothing>>

D: Now, if you identify that suspect, we will reward you with an additional $25. This is on top of
your guaranteed payment of 20 dollars that you will get regardless. Do you understand?
End Manipulation
You will be performing the second attention task AT THE SAME TIME you are participating in
the lineup. This is an auditory task. During the lineup, you must listen to a prerecorded track on
headphones. The track will play a number of tones.
Begin Manipulation 1 (AB)
A: Your task is simply to listen to the tones play while the lineup takes place.
B: Your task is to identify the tones and keep track of how many you have heard. At the end of
the lineup, I will come back into this room and ask HOW MANY tones you heard. We are
interested in how close you are able to get to the correct number of tones.
End Manipulation
To give you an idea of what this task is like, we will first practice together with a 1 min practice
track. Go ahead and remove these headphones from the plastic and place them in this IPod. Can
you still hear me with the headphones on? Good. Remember the tones will be occurring at the
same time you are interacting with the lineup administrator.
I will start the track now. <<Play “Practice”>><<Wait for 1 minute track to end>>
Begin Manipulation 1 (AB)
A: Good, were you able to hear the tones?
B: Good. How many tones did you hear? (4 is correct).
Correct: Good, that is correct.
Incorrect: Actually, the correct answer was four.
End Manipulation
That is it for practice. For the actual task, I will start the track and leave the room. Very shortly
after I start the track, the lineup administrator will come in to conduct the lineup. It is important
that you do both tasks at the same time.
Begin Manipulation 2 (CD):
C: <<nothing>>
D: Remember, if you identify the suspect, we will reward you with an additional $25.
End Manipulation
Do you have any questions before we begin? <<Answer questions>>
Okay are you ready? Excellent, here we go…<<Tell to put headphones back in if they are out>>
Begin Manipulation 1 (AB):
A: <<Play track “Simple”>> <<TURN OVER I POD>>
B: <<Play track “Complex” >> <<TURN OVER I POD>>
End Manipulation

<<Come back to office>><<Wait for lineup to be finished>>
<<Go back in>><<Turn over IPod, stop track>>
<<Turn over IPod, stop track>>
Begin Manipulation 1 (AB):
A: If you had to guess, about how many tones did you hear?
B: How many tones did you hear?
End Manipulation

Track Time
Number of Tones
Okay, it is time for the third and final task. This is just a short questionnaire for you to fill out.
We want to know a bit about you, your memory, and the other tasks you completed today. Take
your time and—when you are done—just wait here. In a few minutes the research coordinator
will be in to pay you and answer any questions you have.

Appendix K: Informed Consent Document in Study 2
Title of Research Study:

Legal Decision Making

Principal Investigator:

Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D.
Professor of Psychology, Presidential Scholar

Co-Principal Investigator:

Andrew J. Evelo, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate

Research Sponsor:

Funded by a 2017 Graduate Center Dissertation
Fellowship and the National Science Foundation

You are being asked to participate in a research study because you are 18 years of age or
older and a resident of the United States. The purpose of this research study is to examine
decision making in a common legal setting. If you volunteer to participate in this research
study, we will ask you to watch a video and then participate in some tasks. For scientific
reasons, this consent form does not include complete information about the purpose of this
research. You will be fully debriefed following your participation in the research. We
anticipate it will take approximately 45 minutes.
The potential risks associated with this study are minimal. You will receive no direct benefits
from your participation. For your time, you will be compensated $20 cash at the end of the
study.
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected
during this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only
with your permission or as required by law. We will protect your confidentiality by replacing
your direct identifying information (e.g., names, contact info) with codes. Only the principle
investigators will be able to pair your data with your name. This data will be stored for future
research. Publications, presentations, and data repositories that result from this study will
not contain this identifying information.
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. You can decide to withdraw
your consent and stop participating in the research at any time, without any penalty.

If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of
the following researchers:

Andrew J. Evelo, M.A. (Co-Principal Investigator)
Doctoral Candidate
aevelo@gradcenter.cuny.edu
Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D. (Principal Investigator and Faculty Advisor)
Professor of Psychology, Presidential Scholar
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call
the CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email at HRPP@cuny.edu.
Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
Signature of Participant
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be
given a copy of this consent form to keep.

_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant

_____________________________________________________
Signature of Participant

__________________________
Date

Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent

_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent

_____________________________________________________
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent

__________________________
Date

Appendix L: Administrator Steering Script in Study 2
Suspect will now always be in the second position
When you place two down, pause and add emphasis with voice
Anytime two mentioned double tap the suspect photo twice (mentalist trick)

Obtain Correct ID
If leaning toward Number 2
Get that ID
1. The witness is there;
• “Excellent, so how confident in that decision”…get confidence
• “Perfect…”
2. The witness needs a push:
• “Good, so 2 resemble the culprit? How similar?”
• “Isn’t that enough for ID”
• “Okay that’s pretty good, should we choose him?
• “Good, what about Number 2, resembles the target?”
• “Does 2 most resemble the target?”
• Consider using tools at this point but keep focus on 2

Toolbox
If needs steering
These are three tools to use if no Suspect ID
Use as feel natural, definitely no more than 10 seconds dead time
Feel free to use your own words to reach the same goal
Use as they come naturally in flow of conversation
You should definitely try using each one at least once
You are encouraged to use multiple times if need be
3. Prodding: get witness to mention target. Once they mention the target then stay on that target,
writing down information and seeming happy (repeat as necessary)
• “Which features in the photos (of each picture) resemble the culprit?”
• “Is there anyone who looks most like the culprit?”
• “Remember, sometime they can look a bit differently.”
• “is there anyone who looks
• “You paused (or something) on 2, what else about 2”
• “What about 2, do you recognize 2”
• “Is there anyone who looks most like the culprit”
• “What about if you looked at 2 from a different angle”

4. Elimination: The idea here is to naturally make the lineup smaller while keeping the suspect
in the lineup. You can do this by moving pictures, rearranging pictures, turning pictures over, or
putting pictures back in the envelope… whatever feels natural in the context. The witness may
naturally eliminate, or say it’s not one of the pictures. You may need to suggest if other
techniques aren’t working.
• “Good, so let’s get rid of him”
• “Okay, let’s put him over to the side”
• “Good, let’s just deal with this row”
• “I think we should leave him out”
• “Let’s just deal with these photos”
• “Why don’t we stick with these?”
5. Suggest alternatives: the idea here is to get the witness to compare photos, one of which is
the suspect. This may work in a variety of circumstances without focusing only on 2, without
removing pictures, or after you have already removed pictures.
• “I saw you focus on the top row, are any of these three similar to the culprit”
• “So of these two do you have a preference”
• “What about these two/three/four stick out”
• “So do you think its Number 2, or would you rather say tis no one” (emphasis)

Allowing a Foil or Rejection
If witness wants to make a bad choice
If all techniques have been tried at least once
None seem to be working
Only then can you suggest that you will unhappily accept the wrong answer.
6. Showing Displeasure: the idea here is two show displeasure and offer chances for them to
rethink their decision and make another choice. You want to make it clear that they are making
the wrong choice. You must give them three chances to rethink. You can use your own words
though. Example:
1. “Okay, are you sure? Why don’t you look again?
2. “Okay if you want that can be your final choice… but this is very important, and I’d
like for you to look again”
“Okay, I guess that’s fine if you are really confident”

Appendix M: Video Informed Consent Document in Study 2
I understand that the lineup procedure I participated in was videotaped. The experimenter has
explained to me why it was necessary to videotape the session. I have been given an opportunity
to view my tape, decline the use of my tape, and erase my tape before anyone else has the
opportunity to view it.
The experimenter has gone over my two options for the use of my videotaped data. These
include:
_____ I give permission for the researchers associated with this project to use, view, and
analyze my videotape. The video will not be shown to others or be used for future
research projects.
_____ I do not give permission for my video tape to be used and would like my videotape
deleted.
I have read the above statement and give my permission for the researchers to use my videotape
data for the purposes I have indicated above.

__________________________________
Print Name

__________________________________
Signature

___________________
Date

Appendix N: Video Coding Forms in Study 2
1. Time of lineup:
Minutes

Seconds

Lineup start:

When did envelope open?

Lineup end:

When is the last time that the witness orally
expresses or confirms their final ID decision?

2. Overall pressure to choose (anyone): (circle one)
1
Very Low

2
Low

3
Medium

4
High

5
Very High

Witness Behavior
1:☐ The witness changed his/her lineup choice after an initial identification
Original choice:

#1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

Reject☐

??☐

Final choice:

#1☐

#2☐

#3☐

#4☐

#5☐

#6☐

Reject☐

??☐

2:☐ The witness changed his/her confidence
Initial confidence

______________________

Final confidence

______________________

Administrator
Who was the administrator?
☐ Raquel
☐ Amanda
☐ Kelsey
☐ Jane
☐ Audrey
☐ Paloma
☐ Denisha
☐ Other:

________________________
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